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ABSTRACT 
Empowerment of previously disadvantaged groups has been applied in many 
countries, in order to achieve specific political, economic and social outcomes. 
Group preferences and preferential policies are common in developed and 
developing countries under various names. They have been mostly implemented in 
countries where a specific ethnic, religious, or gender group has been discriminated 
against historically.  
An ESOP is an empowerment tool that can be adapted and designed to achieve the 
goals of companies, employees and governments. An ESOP is an instrument used 
to enable employee ownership in private and public companies. Internationally the 
application of ESOPs have taken various architectures highly dependent on 
individual company and country circumstances. 
SA has a long and well documented history of racial discrimination and economic 
exclusion. Poverty, unemployment and inequality continue to bedevil the South 
African economy. Transformation in the mining industry is given effect in the Mining 
Charter which is governed under section 100 of the Minerals and Resources 
Development Act. The Charter is buttressed by a key set of pillars. These pillars are 
supplemented by the codes of good practice as well as the housing and living 
conditions standards.   
These pillars include reporting; ownership; housing and living conditions; 
procurement and enterprise development; employment equity; human resource 
development; mine community development; sustainable development and growth 
and beneficiation. This report focusses on the ownership pillar of the Charter.  
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The mining industry has completed a number of empowerment deals post 
implementation of the Mining Charter. The impacts of most BEE deals have not been 
broad-based; and have mostly benefitted only a few HDSA entrepreneurs. The value 
and number of transactions have coincided with the rise and fall of the JSE, making 
the deals expensive – due to elevated stock prices in favourable market conditions.  
ESOPs enable extensive employee ownership; and have the ability to foster a sense 
of individual enterprise that fuels productivity in companies that have imbued a 
culture of ownership amongst their employees. ESOPs generally contribute 
positively to company performance; and they provide a stable and dynamic working 
environment, when administered effectively. ESOPs cannot be implemented in 
isolation; but they require a combination of factors to make them successful.  
ESOPs generally contribute positively to company performance; and they provide a 
stable and dynamic working environment, when administered effectively. Effective 
ESOPs require a combination of elements for success: these comprise of financial 
incentives, employee-involvement mechanisms and the instilling of an ownership 
culture. 
Anglo American was used as a proxy for the industry due to its size and diversity. 
ESOPs that have been implemented have failed to meet stakeholders’ expectations. 
These ESOPs are inconsistent, complicated and mostly opaque to employees; 
whilst delivering modest returns to employees.  
This report proposes the application of a new ESOP framework that is to be 
considered in amending existing ESOPs or in the crafting of new programmes. 
Existing ESOPs are assessed against this proposed framework in this report. The 
proposed ESOP framework is supported by a set of key principles, essential to the 
success of the framework.  
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The performance of ESOPs in Anglo American varied when assessed against the 
framework. With the exception of Envision, Anglo American’s ESOPs have delivered 
very modest financial benefits to employees. They have not achieved their intended 
purpose, of empowering employees and aligning company performance with 
individual employee performance. When assessed against the other pillars of the 
framework, KIO and AAP did not perform satisfactorily.
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Historically, black South Africans have been excluded from the mainstream 
economy; and this has resulted in skewed distribution patterns of wealth and 
participation in the South African (SA) economy. Through various legislative 
instruments, the SA government has endeavoured to reconstruct the economy to 
better reflect South African society, and to eradicate some of SA’s social ills.    
Poverty, unemployment and inequality continue to bedevil the country; and as such, 
the mining industry continues to be a politically charged industry, which is seen by 
many as being capable of addressing SA’s developmental goals. Consequently, the 
SA government is implementing policies to transfer mining assets to Historically 
Disadvantaged South Africans (HDSAs). The government has sought to achieve 
these objectives through the introduction of the Mining Charter. 
The Mining Charter stems from the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development 
Act of 2002 (MPRDA), where it states in section 2(c) that the objectives of the Act 
are to “promote equitable access to the nation’s mineral and petroleum resources – 
to all the people of South Africa”. It further states in 2(d), that some of the objectives 
are to “substantially and meaningfully expand opportunities for historically 
disadvantaged persons, including women, to enter the mineral and petroleum 
industries, and to benefit from the exploitation of the nation’s mineral and petroleum 
resources” (Government Gazette vol.448, 2002). 
The Act further states in Chapter 3, that: “the Minister must ensure the sustainable 
development of South Africa’s mineral and petroleum resources within a framework 
of national environment policy, norms and standards, while promoting economic and 
social development” (Government Gazette vol.448, 2002).
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1.1 Background and Motivation 
In September 2010, the South African government published a Revised Broad-
Based Socio-economic Empowerment Charter (BBSEE) for the Mining Industry. The 
revised Charter sought to give clarity to ambiguities existing in the original Charter, 
whilst providing more specific targets than its predecessor. With the 2014 review of 
the performance of mining companies with respect to the different elements of the 
Mining Charter, there has been a great deal of uncertainty in the mining industry with 
regard to how companies have performed (Anglo American Corporate Finance , 
2013). 
The revised charter calls for “effective ownership” of mining companies by HDSAs. 
This is defined in the revised Charter as “the meaningful participation of HDSAs in 
the ownership, voting rights, economic interest and management control of mining 
entities” (Department of Mineral Resources, 2010). 
The regulator and mining companies disagree on performance. Government and the 
industry produce different performance results; with government intimating that 
industry is overstating their performance, and the industry pointing to government’s 
inability to recognise good performance (Anglo American Corporate Finance , 2013). 
The mining industry is of the view that the interpretation afforded by the DMR, that 
Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) deals completed after 2004, which resulted in 
participants disposing their assets, should result in renewed BEE deals is flawed. 
This has resulted in the DMR finding certain companies not having complied with 
the ownership aspects, due to the current reduced black ownership (Mthimkhulu, 
2015). 
The industry is of the view that those deals completed with empowered entities 
should be included in the ownership calculation as it represents HDSA ownership. It 
further ads that the Charter does not require the industry to maintain 26% ownership 
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once it has been achieved. The chamber believes the exclusion of past deals results 
in a material misrepresentation of HDSA participation (Mthimkhulu, 2015).  
This report will investigate the different models used by companies for compliance 
with the ownership aspect of the Charter. The specific focus of this study will be on 
the different Employee Share Ownership Plans (ESOPs) adopted and the 
performance of this particular instrument.  
These ESOPs will be evaluated against a new proposed framework that 
commandeers the virtues of a successful ESOP in the South African context. Anglo 
American is used as a case study and proxy for the industry; because it is the largest 
and most diversified company, with four (4) business units in SA, namely coal, 
platinum, iron ore and diamonds.  
1.2 Relevance and Importance of the Topic 
Over the past decade the mining industry has faced significant challenges relating 
to policy uncertainty, labour unrest and escalating costs. Most recently, the 
Association of Mineworkers and Construction Union (AMCU) engaged in a 5-
months’ strike. The strike has demonstrated the publicly perceived charge of an 
ongoing trust deficit that exists between business, labour and government.  
It is important to investigate the reasons behind these events, especially because 
mining companies have instated ESOPs – with the expectation that this would 
achieve the aims envisaged in the Mining Charter. It is also important to investigate 
this topic because of the evolving minerals policy and regulatory environment.  
The effectiveness of mining policy needs to be reviewed to assist in further policy 
development and implementation. Hence, there needs to be an understanding of the 
reasons behind the successes or failures of the current Mining Charter requirements 
and identification of opportunities to improve on development polices.    
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1.3 Problem Statement 
The Mining Charter was developed to transform the socio-economic landscape of 
the mining industry in SA. In principle, most mining companies have expressed 
broad support for the objectives of the Charter and the outcomes it seeks to achieve. 
However, there have been disagreements between the regulator and the mining 
industry with regard to the performance of companies in aspiring to achieve the 
objectives of the Charter (Anglo American Corporate Finance , 2013). 
The effectiveness of initiatives by mining companies to both comply with Charter 
requirements and improve the socio-economic conditions of HDSA’s have received 
mixed reviews. ESOPs instituted by mining companies do not seem to be meeting 
the expectations of all the important stakeholders, mainly employees, the companies 
themselves and the regulator (Anglo American Corporate Finance , 2013). 
1.4 Objectives 
The objective of the study is to propose a framework to be used by mining companies 
when establishing ESOPs. The framework is underpinned by key fundamental pillars 
and will encapsulate the main virtues of successful ESOPs applied in a South African 
context.  This report will evaluate the efficacy of current ESOPs in Anglo American; 
and test them against this proposed framework.  
1.5 Methodology 
The methodology applied in completing this report, in order to address the objectives 
of the study was as follows:  
 Utilise historical and current government literature; 
 Utilise data from the mining companies; and 
 Utilising information collected from desktop studies. 
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This report has utilised Anglo American data. Anglo American can be considered as 
a proxy for the industry, due to its dominance in the local industry. The report used 
current and historical policy documents. Generic literature on ESOPs was also used. 
The report also used publicly available data from company annual reports and 
research reports discussing this issue.  
1.6 Report structure 
Chapter 1 introduces the scope of the study; and it provides the reasons for 
conducting this research. Chapter 2 provides a literature review on the 
empowerment of previously disadvantaged groups in other countries and application 
of ESOPs in those profiled countries. Chapter 2 also provides socio-political and 
socio-economic conditions that necessitated the empowerment of HDSAs. 
Furthermore, the chapter provides a review of ESOPs and the different associated 
models.  
Chapter 3 focuses on Anglo American and the company’s contribution to SA and the 
mining industry. Furthermore, the structure of Anglo American’s empowerment deals 
in SA is analysed in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 provides an analysis of Anglo American’s 
ESOPs. 
Chapter 5 proposes a new approach to ESOPs in the mining industry. A set of 
principles is afforded that underpins the proposed framework. Chapter 6 analyses 
Anglo American’s ESOPs against this framework.  Chapter 7 contains the conclusion 
and recommendations of the report.   
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2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Empowerment of historically disadvantaged groups 
internationally  
The empowerment of previously disadvantaged groups is a common practice 
internationally; and goes by various names in different countries. The tools and 
policy instruments adopted to achieve empowerment goals vary from country to 
country. Common names of empowerment philosophies include compensatory 
discrimination; preferential policies; positive action; and affirmative discrimination 
(Martin, 2001).  
In his empirical study, Sowell (2004) studied how preferential policies have been 
implemented throughout history in various countries. He found that empowerment 
policies in some countries have included preferences for minority groups in society, 
whilst others were structured to favour majorities.  
In other countries these policies where aimed at various classes in those 
communities. These group preferences have been applied in countries, such as 
India, Britain, Sri-Lanka, Nigeria, Malaysia, Indonesia, Israel, China, Australia, 
Brazil, Fiji, Canada, Pakistan, New Zealand, the United States of America (USA) 
and the Soviet Union, as well as its successive States (Sowell, 2004). There are a 
number of empowerment instruments that can be adopted depending on the nature 
of exclusion and envisaged outcome.  
An ESOP is an empowerment tool that can be adapted and designed to achieve the 
goals of companies, employees and governments. An ESOP is an instrument used 
to enable employee ownership in private and public companies. Internationally the 
application of ESOPs have taken various architectures highly dependent on 
individual company and country circumstances (Gates and Saghir, 1995). 
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ESOPs are implemented for a variety of reasons, including broadening ownership, 
enhancing company performance, and facilitating privatization in previously state 
owned entities and carrying other reform measure as well as raising money for 
corporate purposes (Gates and Saghir, 1995). 
2.1.1 Empowerment Policies in the Soviet Union  
The Soviet Union was a large multi-ethnic state with an assembly of territories with 
diverse interests. It was the first state in the old European architecture to face strong 
nationalism and responded with the systematic promotion of its ethnic minorities. 
Martin (2001) provided a comprehensive assessment of the manifestation of group 
preferences in the large diverse national republics and territories scattered across 
the Soviet empire.  
The majority of Soviet nationalities were regarded as culturally backward, compared 
to the Russians, Ukrainians, Georgians, Armenians, Jews and Germans; who were 
grouped as western nationalities. The Union was essentially divided into two regions, 
the East and the West (Martin, 2001).  
The East had a problem of low literate, uneducated nationals; and so empowerment 
policies were skewed toward education and hiring of citizens from the East. In the 
West, literate and educated nationals were abundant, with the policy focusing on 
language, and establishing the national language as the official state language. 
“Economic equalisation”, which referred to the redistribution of economic power, 
through preferential policies in education and hiring of the local population was 
preferred (Martin, 2001). 
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2.1.1.1 ESOPs in the Soviet Union  
ESOPs have been used in the former Soviet Union for empowering employees 
utilising previously state owned entities. ESOPs became a popular empowerment 
tool because they ensured workers benefited from the privatization programme that 
ensued post the collapse of the Soviet Union (Gates and Saghir, 1995). 
2.1.2 Preferential Policies in India  
India has a large and diverse population, with over a billion people living within its 
borders. The country has 6 main ethnic groups, 52 major tribes, 6 major religions, 
and 6400 castes and sub-castes – with 18 major languages and 1 600 minor 
languages and dialects (Castellino and Redondo, 2006). India has long history with 
preferential policies for targeted groups beginning under British colonial rule. India’s 
constitution espouses policies designed to assist disadvantaged segments of its 
population (Sowell, 2004). 
In 1950, the first amendment to the constitution enshrined preferential policies and 
programmes for deprived peoples, untouchables, Scheduled Castes and Tribes 
(Castellino and Redondo, 2006). There are different policies that predominated; 
those aimed at national minorities viewed as less fortunate and policies in the 
various states in India that target local groups. Tribal groupings that fell outside the 
social mainstream were also included (Sowell, 2004). 
Sowell (2004) describes how these policies were implemented with the objective of 
raising the socio-economic conditions of these groups through what was termed 
“positive discrimination”. These preferential policies were given effect in preferential 
hiring, admissions in institutions of higher learning and parliamentary representation 
amongst others. All of these were designed to overcome historical discriminatory 
patterns.  
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2.1.2.1 ESOPs in India  
The use of ESOPs in India is common with varying design practices. Most of the 
ESOPs have been implemented in the Information Technology (IT) sector 
accounting for 61% of all ESOPs. This practice is particular tor the IT sector due to 
recruitment patterns in this sector and the need to retain highly skilled and globally 
mobile employees. ESOPs have been used as a retention tool in these companies 
(Pathak and Saraswathy, 2011).  
2.1.3 Employment Equity in Canada 
Renowned scholar Loney (1998) examined how preferential hiring policies placed 
race and gender at the centre of Canadian politics. There were various groupings 
that were beneficiaries of preferential policies in Canada. They had a specific 
concern for those who were said to have experienced double discrimination, notably 
women of colour. Aboriginal (First Nation) Canadians have also been the target of 
employment equity legislation aimed at addressing the historical injustices that 
Aboriginal’s have suffered (Loney, 1998). 
2.1.3.1 ESOPs in Canada 
ESOPs have been widely used in Canada with some dating back 40 years. These 
ESOPs started out in the public sector as a means of rewarding employees for their 
efforts, then later expanded to all employers. Some organisations in Canada have 
used ESOPs post the financial crisis in 2008 as a job saving mechanism. Examples 
of such organisations include Algoma Steel, Spruce Falls and Canadian Airlines 
(ESOP Association Canada, 2015).  
The Toronto Stock Exchange conducted a study that compared the performance of 
companies with ESOPs and those without ESOPs. The study found that companies 
with ESOPs had a 123% profit growth over 5 years, 95% higher net profit margin, 
24% higher productivity, 92.3% higher return on equity and a 65.5% higher return 
on capital (ESOP Association Canada, 2015). 
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2.1.4 Empowerment in Malaysia 
Malaysia has a population of approximately 23 million people; and it is considered 
to be one of the most prosperous countries in Southeast Asia. As many as 50% of 
the population are Malays; 24% are Chinese; and 7% are Indian. In 1948, the 
population of colonial Malaysia was 45% Chinese, 43% Malay, and 10% Indian. 
Apart from the 3 groups that exist in Malaysia there are other indigenous peoples, 
who together make up the Bumiputeras or the “sons of the soil” (Sowell, 2004). 
As early as 2500 BC, technologically advanced groupings migrated to Malaysia from 
China. These groups of seafarers and farmers encountered and forced the 
indigenous populations into the hills and jungles. In later years, the Chinese 
predominated in the urban areas and mining districts; whilst the largest numbers of 
Indians were found in rubber areas (known for its production of natural rubber) 
mainly located on the West coast. Malays mostly lived in the in the Northern region, 
outside towns in rural areas (Castellino and Redondo, 2006). 
Under British rule, Malaysia instituted policies in favour of the Malay population, 
whilst utilising cheap Indian labour to work in the peninsula. The Chinese were left 
to govern themselves; and utilised their entrepreneurial skills to get ahead. Chinese 
businesses flourished after the British rule; whilst the economic fortunes of the 
Malays languished. (Castellino and Redondo, 2006). 
Sowell (2004) found that although Malays were more privileged than the Chinese, 
through rising incomes in the Chinese population, they managed to earn more than 
double the average income of Malays. This produced resentment, which precipitated 
demands from the Malay populous for preferential policies. At this time under British 
rule, the Malays already enjoyed preferential treatment; with other groups facing 
strong restrictions on land ownership and Malay children provided with free 
education. Despite these policies, the Chinese continued to outperform the other 
ethnic groups. 
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With the exclusion of Singapore (due to their high Chinese population) and other 
territories, Malaya became Malaysia. Policies included the political hegemony of the 
Malays. This was achieved by constitutional guarantees   and by positively weighting 
votes in rural areas, where the Malay population mostly predominated (Sowell, 
2004). 
The Malays wanted to preserve and maintain this preferential treatment for 
themselves, and for other indigenous peoples, whilst the Chinese demanded equal 
treatment for all citizens.  The inter-ethnic strife was resolved, when Malaysia 
expelled Singapore in 1965, because of Singapore’s high Chinese population, 
leaving Malaysia with a comfortable Malay majority (Sowell, 2004). 
According to Sowell (2004), new economic policies emanated where preferences 
that existed under government employment were extended to the private sector. The 
policy also prescribed that 30% of all corporate shares should be transferred to the 
Malay population, during which time they owned no more than 2% of the country’s 
corporate equity.  
2.1.4.1 ESOPs in Malaysia  
The use of ESOPs in Malaysia are not as popular as Employee Stock Options 
(ESOs). Many publicly traded companies use this tool for employee compensation 
and incentives packages (Bacha et al., 2009). 
2.1.5 Empowerment in the United States of America 
Anderson (2004), has studied the history of affirmative action in the USA. He 
describes how many States in the 1880s promulgated various discriminatory laws 
based on race. These States established segregated schools, hospitals, jails and 
homes for the impoverished, elderly, deaf – and even for the blind. 
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Preferential policies and practices in the USA have been described as correction, 
the forestalling of discrimination, or as promoting diversity. Group preferences 
evolved out of laws initially seeking to ban discrimination against individuals (Sowell, 
2004). Anderson (2004) found that group preferences had been part of American 
national policy for more than 40 years.  
Companies in the USA are required to have affirmative action plans that ensure 
equal employment opportunities. If companies do not abide by their policy, the 
government may bar them from making contracts. Public institutions and universities 
must have preferential policies, including those private institutions that accept grants 
(Sowell, 2004). 
2.1.5.1 ESOPs in the USA 
The USA has implement the most number of ESOPs within companies operating in 
that country since the first ESOP was created in 1956 (Gates and Saghir, 1995). In 
2011 The National Center for Employee Ownership found that 11,300 ESOPs 
existed in the USA which covered 13.3 million employees who collectively held 
approximately $900 billion in assets (Rodgers, 2011). 
The study also found that companies employing ESOPs in the USA experienced 
faster growth rates in sales, employment and productivity. These companies also 
have higher compensation for employees, higher employee retirement assets and 
lower staff turnover (Rodgers, 2011). 
2.1.6 Group Preferences in Sri Lanka 
In Sri Lanka, simmering discontent and ethnic tensions had resulted in a full scale 
civil war, which subsequently divided the island-state. Sri Lanka has seen the two 
largest ethnic groups, the Sinhala (74%), who dominate State institutions and the 
army, and the Tamil minority (13%), who have resorted to guerrilla warfare, engaging 
in a vicious civil war. The minority Muslim population is mostly ignored in the face of 
this ongoing feud (Castellino and Redondo, 2006).   
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Historically, the Tamils were located in the northern part of the state, characterised 
by a dry climate and devoid of natural endowments. The Sinhalese were located in 
the more prosperous region with high rainfall and fertile ground. The Tamils readily 
took advantage of the education opportunities provided for by the missionary schools 
established (Sowell, 2004). 
The Tamil minority was more favourably represented in universities, in the 
professions and in businesses than the Sinhalese majority. In 1956, the government 
instituted “Sinhala only” as the official language. Declining prospects, both in 
education and employment, led to the Tamils protesting, resulting in lethal riots in 
subsequent years. Ultimately, a civil war broke out between the two ethnic groups 
(Sowell, 2004). 
Sri Lanka has enshrined minority rights in the country’s Constitution and legal 
system, from the autonomy of regimes and negotiations with the Tamils, to the 
reservation of seats in political and governance structures and public institutions 
(Castellino and Redondo, 2006).   
2.1.6.1 ESOP in Sri Lanka 
ESOPs have been used in Sri Lanka in both the private and public sector. In the 
public sector these have been used in programmes that have been termed the 
“peoplisation programmes” aimed at transferring ownership of state enterprises into 
the hands of employees. In the private sector ESOPs have been used to expand 
employee ownership with the intended purpose of increasing profitability through 
greater employee satisfaction (Pushpakumara et al., 2009). 
Pushpakumara et al. (2009) studied the profitability of listed companies in Sri Lanka 
that have applied ESOPs. They found that ESOPs where not a significant 
determinant of profitability in those listed companies. One reason cited for this 
conclusion was the lack of significant share allocations afforded to employees with 
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most shares not afforded voting rights and used as a compensation tool for 
employees.  
2.1.7 Summary 
Empowerment of previously disadvantaged groups has been applied in many 
countries, in order to achieve specific political, economic and social outcomes. 
Group preferences and preferential policies are common in developed and 
developing countries under various names. They have been mostly implemented in 
countries where a specific ethnic, religious, or gender group has been discriminated 
against historically.  
These preferential policies have manifested in employment equity, ownership of 
land, protected representation in education and parliament in these countries. In 
most of the profiled countries ESOPs have been used as an empowerment tool for 
the collective benefit of employees, employers and governments.  
South Africa has its own history of discrimination and economic exclusion based on 
race.  Section 2.2 - 2.7 will focus on empowerment in the South African context, from 
a broader economic perspective to a more specific focus of empowerment in the 
mining industry. Section 2.8 will discuss ESOPs in terms of their formulation, 
structure and application with the advantages and disadvantages of each model. 
The various plans adopted by companies in the South African economy will be 
profiled.   
2.2 SA’s Historical context 
SA has a long and well documented history of racial discrimination and economic 
exclusion. SA’s modern economy has largely been developed on the back of the 
mining industry, with foreign capital turning what was largely an agricultural economy 
into a thriving mining center (Nattrass and Seekings, 2010). 
   
15 
By 1910, gold mining on the Witwatersrand had transformed SA’s economy into an 
industrializing economy, anchored by a strong mineral exporting sector. During that 
time, there existed a set of discriminatory policies and institutions, which sought to 
protect the incomes of mostly white workers, whilst depressing the wages paid to 
unskilled, black employees (Nattrass and Seekings, 2010). 
Assessing the history of SA’s modern economy, Natrass and Seekings (2010) 
provided an analysis of how the SA economy experienced significant change 
throughout the twentieth century. These racially based discriminatory and coercive 
strategies they found, excluded unskilled black workers from the institutional 
framework that fostered economic prosperity. 
These interventions not only ensured high levels of inequality in the short term; but 
they also shaped SA’s growth path, such that high levels of inequality persisted over 
time. SA’s economic growth model ensured that a minority enjoyed disproportionate 
benefits; whilst the rest of the population enjoyed very little and some had no benefits 
at all. Despite a growing economy, poverty and chronic unemployment persisted into 
the second half of the century (Nattrass and Seekings, 2010). 
2.3 Empowerment of HDSA’s 
Apartheid denied the majority of South Africans the opportunity to amass capital in 
any form, such as land, finance, skills, education and social networks. The need to 
promote the drafting of redressing policies was necessitated by the enduring legacy 
of this system (Sharma, 2012). 
South Africa’s level of income distribution and racial inequality is high and persistent. 
South Africa is rated as an upper-middle income country (in terms of GDP per capita 
and economic structure), however its social indicators such as life expectancy, infant 
mortality and quality of education are closer to those of lower-middle countries. This 
is indicative of the levels of inequality within South African society (Van Der Berg, 
2010). 
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Empowerment and the pursuit of equality in the South African context gets its 
tenants from the South African Constitution. Section 9 (2) of the constitution states, 
“equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms. To 
promote the achievement of equality, legislative and other measures designed to 
protect or advance persons, or categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair 
discrimination may be taken” (Constitutional Assembly, 1996). 
Post the power sharing arrangement in 1994 the South African government began 
to formulate their BEE intentions. These intentions found expression in legislative, 
regulatory and policy measures by 2000. At this stage, none of the discussions were 
involved with BEE ownership and investments (Cargill, 2010). 
Much of the discussions were focussed on employment based affirmative action, 
skills training and business development as measures for black empowerment. The 
formulation of the BEE strategy began under the auspices of the Department of 
Trade and Industry in 2003 (DTI) (Cargill, 2010).  
There were a number of BEE deals that were conducted at this time which many 
critics believed only benefitted the political and economic elite. BEE investors 
garnered a reputation for opportunistic rent seeking and unproductive investment 
behaviour without an interest in long term value creation (Cargill, 2010). 
Another important criticism levelled against BEE deals at this time was the choice of 
empowerment partners. Consortiums involved in these transactions often involved 
trade unions, various social groupings and a few politically connected individuals 
(Cargill, 2010). 
After the strategy was adopted by various stakeholders, parliament soon agreed to 
the BEE Act. The various state entities where compelled to formulate and implement 
code and sector charters. The codes sought to mitigate some of the unwanted 
occurrences from the first round of BEE transactions (Cargill, 2010).  
Section 2.4 will delve into the socio-economic conditions of South Africans. It will 
depict the wealth profile of the different race groups in SA.  
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2.4 Current economic status of South Africans  
Currently, wealth distribution in SA is skewed toward minority groups; whilst the 
majority of the population enjoy modest incomes. Figure 1 below, depicts the 
variance in average annual household income in the different ethnic groups. The 
average annual income in Black households was R60, 613 in 2011, significantly less 
than coloured-headed households at R112, 172. Indian households had the second 
highest annual income at R251, 541 in 2011.  
White-headed households had the highest average household income at R365, 134 
per annum. The average increase in the annual household income for black Africans 
was R38, 091 from 2001-2011; for the Coloured community, it was R60, 732; for the 
Indian/Asian community, it was R148, 935; and for the White community, it was 
R171, 314 (Statistics South Africa, 2011). This indicates growing racial inequality 
and further exacerbation the aforementioned economic exclusion. This requires 
more effective policy instruments tailored for redress.   
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Figure 1: Average annual household income by population group (Statistics 
South Africa, 2011) 
The kernel density curve of income distribution by race portrayed in Figure 2 below 
depicts how white incomes far exceed those of blacks and consequently lie to the 
right, with coloureds and Indians taking intermediate positions (Van De Berg, 
2010). 
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Figure 2: Kernel Density curve of income distribution by group (Van De Berg, 
2010) 
South Africa still struggles with income inequality. The average annual income of 
white South Africans is significantly higher than that of other groups in the country. 
The income disparity is most significant between white South Africans and black 
Africans. Section 2.5 outlines some of the policy instruments used to achieve redress 
in the broader economy.  
2.5 Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Sector Charters 
The Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment (BBBEE) Amendment Act, is used 
as the policy instrument governing transformation in the broader SA economy. The 
Act defines broad-based black economic empowerment as the economic 
empowerment of all black people. The definition singles out the empowerment of 
women, workers, youth, people with disabilities and people living in rural areas. The 
strategies outlined to achieve this include, but are not limited to:  
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 Increased management, ownership and enterprise control of productive 
assets;  
 ownership and management of enterprises and productive assets by 
communities, workers, co-operatives and other collective enterprises; 
 human resource and skills development of black people; 
 equitable representation in different levels in the workforce;  
 preferential procurement; and 
 investment in black owned enterprises (Parliament of the Republic of South 
Africa, 2013) 
The DTI in 2007 introduced the Codes of Good Practice, in terms of which a number 
of transformation sector charters were introduced (Department of Trade and 
Industry, 2016). The charters are outline in Table 1 below.  
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Table 1: Transformation sector charters (Department of Trade and Industry, 
2016) 
Sector Charters Effective 
Date 
Highlights 
Agri-BEE 
Charter 
28 
December 
2012 
Charter supports land reform by setting equity and land 
ownership targets. Recognition given for long-term 
leases under enterprise development and socio-
economic development elements. Greenfield ventures, 
job creation and beneficiation of primary products, and 
support industrialisation, highly recognised  
Financial Sector 
Charter 
26 
November 
2012 
Transformation guidelines for the financial sector. 8 
pillars in Financial Sector Charter. Extra element, known 
as Access to Financial Services, aims to facilitate access 
to finance for black people and black-owned enterprises. 
 (ICT) Charter  6 June 
2012 
30% black ownership to be achieved by entities in the 
sector. 5% Net Profit After Tax to be spend on enterprise 
development initiatives. 1.5% of Net Profit After Tax on 
Socio Economic Development Initiatives  
Property Sector 
Charter 
1 June 
2012 
Charter introduced targets such as measurements for 
Economic Development used for investment for 
properties in underdeveloped areas and thus reduce 
service inequalities and the limited tradability of 
properties in these areas.  
Chartered 
Accountancy 
Sector Code 
10 May 
2011 
Chartered Accountancy Profession to increase the 
number of black people, particularly black women 
entering the profession.  
Integrated 
Transport 
Sector Codes  
21 August 
2009 
Comprises eight (8) sub-sectors, which seek to boost 
one of South Africa's largest infrastructure and Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) contributors. Aims to fast-track 
the implementation of efficient transportation, freight and 
logistics sectors within the economy. 35% black-
ownership target, within a period of five (5) years. 
Forest Sector 
Code  
12 June 
2009 
30% BEE ownership. It further seeks to encourage and 
support entities to undertake BEE-compliant 
procurement and job creation initiatives in the sector. 
Construction 
Sector Code 
5 June 
2009 
Advancement of transformation and BEE in the 
procurement of construction programmes and services. 
30% black ownership in the industry over the next 10 
years. 
Tourism Sector 
Code  
22 May 
2009 
Seeks to ensure that a significant number of enterprises 
doing business in the tourism industry are not excluded 
Section 2.6 below outlines the empowerment governance framework in the mining 
industry.  
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2.6 Empowerment in the Mining Industry  
2.6.1 Policy Framework  
The mining industries policy framework is governed by the Constitution of South 
Africa and the MPRDA. The Mining Charter is provided for in terms of section 100 
of the MPRDA as instrument for transformation in the industry (Department of 
Mineral Resources, 2015). 
Transformation in terms of the Charter is buttressed by a key set of identified pillars. 
These pillars are supplemented by the codes of good practice as well as the housing 
and living conditions standards as per section 100 of the MPRDA. Figure 3 below 
summarises the framework (Department of Mineral Resources, 2015). 
The Charter pillars include reporting; ownership; housing and living conditions; 
procurement and enterprise development; employment equity; human resource 
development; mine community development; sustainable development and growth 
and beneficiation (Department of Mineral Resources, 2015). For compliance with the 
Charter companies are measured against these pillars.  
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Figure 3: A structure of the transformation policy framework for the mining 
industry (Department of Mineral Resources, 2015) 
2.6.2 Scoring Principles  
Table 2 below sets out the performance measures prescribed by the Charter. These 
measures include targets and compliance dates. 
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Table 2: Scoring principles for the elements of the charter (Department of 
Mineral Resources, 2015) 
Element   
  
Scoring Principle 
Reporting  Percentage of companies that have reported on 
the Charter requirements  
 
Ownership  Category 1: Equal or greater than 26% HDSA but 
does without all three identifiable beneficiaries i.e. 
Entrepreneurs, ESOPS & 
Communities. 
Category 2: Equal or greater than 26% HDSA 
without trickle cash flow to HDSA. 
Category 2+: Equal or greater than 26% HDSA 
ownership, broad-based, reported trickle cash flow 
to HDSA. 
Category 3: HDSA ownership below 26%. 
Housing and Living Conditions  100% conversion of hostels using the following 
measures: One person per room by 2014. 
Conversion of hostels into family units by 2014. 
 
Procurement and Enterprise 
Development 
Percentage expenditure from BEE entities by 2014: 
Capital goods = 40%, Services = 70%, 
Consumables = 50% and 0.5% of annual spend on 
procurement from multinational suppliers 
Employment Equity  HDSA representation: Top Management = 40%, 
Senior Management = 40%, Middle Management = 
40%, Junior Management = 40% and Core Skills = 
40% by 2014 
Human Resource Development Payroll expenditure on training  2014 target was 
5% of total annual payroll (excluding mandatory 
skills development levies) to be spent on HRD 
Mine Community Development Implementation of mine 
community project commitments by December 
2014 
Sustainable Development  Percentage implementation of the tripartite plan on 
mine health and safety,  2014 targets were 
Environment Management Plans = 100%, Tripartite 
Action Plan = 100% and Percentage of samples in 
South African facilities = 100% 
Beneficiation Contribution of a mining company towards 
beneficiation (this measure is effective from 2012) 
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2.7 Empowerment deals in the Mining Industry 
2.7.1 Chamber of Mines assessment of members’ empowerment transactions 
in the industry 
  
Current empowerment policies are said to encourage redistribution rather than 
productive ownership. Where this productive ownership has occurred has not been 
by way of policy design, but by chance with inequitable benefit distribution. 
Sustainability of shareholding has been extremely difficult, due to high debt levels of 
empowerment partners who are also restricted from trading shares (Cargill, 2010).  
Meaningful economic participation in relation to HDSA beneficiaries has four key 
attributes as described in the Charter which include (Department of Mineral 
Resources, 2010):  
 Identifiable HDSA beneficiaries in the form of BEE entrepreneurs, workers and 
communities; 
 Cash flow to BEE partners throughout the term of the investment and the ability 
of BEE entities to leverage equity to facilitate sustainable growth of the BEE 
entities; 
 HDSA participants should have full shareholder rights including participation at 
general meetings and exercising voting rights; 
 And lastly that ownership shall vest within the agreed timeframes.  
The Chamber of Mines has recently released a report, which attempted to 
demonstrate the economic empowerment of HDSAs in the mining industry, in line 
with requirements of the Charter.  The report aggregated overall company 
performance (members of the Chamber of Mines) based on the DMR’s submissions, 
as at 31 December 2014. According to the report: 
 Chamber of Mines members have reached 38% of meaningful economic 
participation by HDSAs, significantly higher than the 26% required by the 
Charter;  
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 Numerous commodity groups have all achieved, or surpassed, ownership targets 
for HDSA as outlined in the Charter: Coal achieved the highest ownership 
percentage at 47.2%; whilst Platinum-Group Metals (PGMs); manganese, iron 
ore chrome and gold where all above 27.2% with the exception of diamonds at 
26%  
 63% of the HDSA population that has benefited are BEE entrepreneurs, with 
communities and employees at 22% and 15% respectively.  
Figure 4 depicts the ownership patterns according to the commodity segment, and 
the beneficiary category. From Figure 4, it is clear that the majority of beneficiaries 
from the deals completed are BEE entrepreneurs. This has attracted criticism with 
regard to the structure of the deals, in that they benefit only a few individuals, rather 
than a larger pool.  
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Figure 4: Portion of ownership of mining industry transferred to HDSA (Wu 
and Moodley, 2009) 
 
When assessing the total value of reported empowerment transactions from 2004-
2008, the mining industry had its highest transactions in 2007 not only in value but 
also in volume terms. More than R40 billion in transaction value was amassed 
underlined by 34 transactions. Figure 5 below depicts the transaction value through 
this period (Wu and Moodley, 2009).  
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Figure 5: Value of transactions in the mining sector (Wu and Moodley, 2009) 
Figure 6 below depicts the increase in value of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange 
(JSE’s) resources index from 2005 reaching a peak in mid-2008, then declining in 
the latter part of 2008. This trend in the Resource 20, which denotes the performance 
of mining companies on the JSE is similar to the trend denoted in figure 5 (Wu and 
Moodley, 2009). 
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2.7.2 Transactions involving employee schemes and community trusts 
From 2004-2008, only 7% of the mining sector transactions during that time involved 
ESOPs; and only 10% involved community-ownership schemes, as shown in Figure 
7 below. Lack of meaningful participation from employees in the schemes, is 
indicative of the popular models for ownership transactions that have been adopted 
in the industry. These transactions were not broad based resulting in limited benefits 
for employees and other stakeholders (Wu and Moodley, 2009).  
Figure 6: Resources 20 index (Financial Times, 2016) 
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Figure 7: BEE transactions involving employees and communities (Wu 
and Moodley, 2009) 
2.7.3 Company transactions 
Table 3 below represents some of the notable empowerment transactions 
conducted in the mining industry over the past decade. Wu and Moodley (2009) 
found that Anglo American and its subsidiaries completed the largest number of 
empowerment deals in the industry, with 10 reported transactions with a combined 
value of approximately R28 billion as at December 2009. 
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In their analysis, Impala Platinum followed the list of mining companies corporates 
with 8 empowerment deals valued at R19.3 billion, with most of the empowerment 
transaction value emanating from the Royal Bafokeng Nation’s acquisition of its 13% 
stake in Impala Platinum – valued at R10.6 billion.  
Table 3: Top 10 contributors and vendors to BEE transactions (Wu and 
Moodley, 2009) 
Rank Contributing entity/ Vendors Total Value of 
Transactions 
(Rand) 
Total Number of 
BEE 
Transactions  
1 Anglo American Group of Companies (including 
Anglogold Ashanti, Anglo Platinum and Scaw 
28,103,448,800 10 
2 Impala Platinum 19,363,000,000  8 
3 Kumba Iron Ore (KIO) 9,200,000,000 2 
4 Northam 6,250,000,000 2 
5 Xstrata 5,370,000,000 3 
6 Arcellor Mittal 4,200,000,000  1 
7 Harmony Gold 3,573,314,660 3 
8 Aquarius Platinum  2,722,526,000 4 
9 De Beers 2,000,000,000 4 
10 Sasol 1,855,000,000 1 
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2.7.4 Summary of benefits to beneficiaries 
The Chamber of Mines asserts that over the 12-year period that the Mining Charter 
has been in effect, a minimum of R47 billion in dividends has accrued to HDSA 
participants (BEE entrepreneurs, employees and communities), which in their 
analysis was found to represents 19.6% of the dividends paid over the same period 
by Chamber of Mines members (Chamber of Mines South Africa, 2015). Figure 8 
provides a breakdown of the transactions and the accrued benefits. 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Meaningful economic participation of HDSA (Chamber of Mines 
South Africa, 2015) 
At the lowest point of the commodity cycle, the net value of the transactions was 
R155 billion according to the Chamber of Mines; whilst at the high point of the cycle, 
the value of the transactions totalled R282 billion. These two points were highly 
dependent on company share price performance.  
The initial transaction value of all empowerment deals, of members in the Chamber 
of Mines was R116 billion with an initial debt of R64 billion. The completed 
transactions have generated significant returns for participants with a net value of 
R159 billion (Chamber of Mines South Africa, 2015). For a complete breakdown of 
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the BEE transactions that have taken place in the various commodity groupings, see 
Appendix 1. 
2.7.5 Assessment by The Department of Mineral Resources on the industry’s 
performance in relation to the Charter   
The assessment conducted by the department in 2009 outline weaknesses in 
company performance as per the Charter requirements in relation to HDSAs. This 
included a conspicuous lack of transfer of ownership, access to funding, 
indebtedness, limited flow of dividends to HDSAs to service loan agreements, 
onerous transaction conditions and financially cumbersome deal structures. 
According to the assessment, BEE ownership was concentrated in a few black 
beneficiaries. In 2009 aggregated ownership was at 9% against a target of 15% 
(Department of Mineral Resources, 2015). 
The 2014 assessment of the Charter concluded that although mining companies 
have reported to the department to have met or exceeded the 26% HDSA ownership 
target, meaningful economic participation by beneficiaries remains elusive. The 
assessment further concluded that the number of broad based empowerment 
transactions involving both communities and ESOPs were low. Results from the 
department’s assessment also found limited impact in terms of beneficiaries 
realising economic benefits (Department of Mineral Resources, 2015). 
2.7.6 Summary  
 
The impacts of most BEE deals have not been broad-based; with 63% of 
transactions from Chamber of Mines members benefitting BEE entrepreneurs with 
communities and employees at 22% and 15%. The value and number of 
transactions have coincided with the rise and fall of the JSE, making the deals 
expensive – due to elevated stock prices in favourable market conditions. Results 
from the Department of Mineral Resources assessment found limited impact in terms 
of beneficiaries realising economic benefits. 
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One of Anglo American’s well known former CEO’s Clem Sunter has said that one 
of the solutions to the current endemic problems in the mining industry is for greater 
participation by employees in companies. This can achieved through the use of 
ESOPs to ensure income inequality is reduced in South Africa, he added (Visser, 
2004).  
Sunter, who was one of the original proponents of the idea is of the opinion that 
ESOPs have never been adequately explored. He regards the implementation of 
ESOPs as a fairer way of implementing BEE as it relates to ownership of capital. As 
an experienced previous executive in Anglo American, Sunter believes ESOPs are 
a better alternative to the BEE deals that have been completed, often making a few 
well connected black individuals wealthy, whilst not being sure of the value ad these 
individuals make to the company as passive investors. Often their knowledge of the 
industry in which they participate is limited (Sunter, 2012).  
With this background in mind, Section 2.8 will focus on ESOPs. 
2.8 ESOPS 
Traditionally the relationship between company owners, management and labour 
has been fractious and at times dysfunctional. This dynamic has made labour 
relations challenging, and not geared toward making organizations reach their full 
potential. ESOPs establishes unity of interests between management and labour, 
owners and employees (Rosen et al., 2005). 
Today’s business environment is characterised by fast changing technological 
advancements and requires a workforce that is engaged and responsive, qualities 
that are too often stifled in traditional organisations. “The organisation that permits 
participation ultimately produces individuals who are responsible to participate” 
(Beirne, 2006).  
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2.8.1 The need for ESOPs 
Postlethwaite et al. (2005) have found that those companies that have embedded 
ESOPs in their business model, have performed better than those have not through 
productivity gains, higher innovation, superior customer loyalty, and improved talent 
management.  
As Postlethwaite et al. (2005) established, this is mainly because those ESOPs that 
have prospered combine three critical factors that ensured the success of the 
scheme. These comprise financial incentives, employee-involvement mechanisms, 
and the instilling of a culture of ownership.  
Most companies with employee share-ownership schemes already possess these 
attributes as single entities. The best results are achieved through the combination 
of all 3 virtues. Where the company is completely owned by employees these 
attributes exist (Postlethwaite et al., 2005). 
When analysing the failures of some ESOPs, Postlethwaite et al. (2005) found how 
some employers make the mistake of simply assessing their business and the 
sector, reviewing their best practice, and concluding that the secret is simply 
employee-share ownership and good communication. They would then emulate that 
part which they thought was the most important, or just the part that they admire. 
However, as a growing number of businesses have discovered, it is the whole 
package that works best. 
An employee’s ability and opportunity to contribute to decision making, 
supplemented by meaningful financial incentives, is that which creates a conducive 
environment for employees to disseminate information about process failures and 
improvement opportunities. Companies with successful ESOPs create mechanisms 
for employees’ contributions to be heard, and timeously acted upon. This is in 
contrast to a working environment that is bureaucratically centralised in its structure 
and working culture (Postlethwaite et al., 2005).  
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Postlethwaite et al. (2005) discovered a strong negative relationship between a 
company’s ability to innovate and a centralised bureaucratic organisation.  This 
facilitates adverse behaviours and attitudes amongst employees; stifling new ideas 
and innovation as well as resisting suggested improvement methods from 
management. 
Those companies that offered broad based ESOPs far outperformed these 
companies. From their study, Kruse concluded that while broad based ESOPs are 
not a guarantee for improved performance and employee attitude, it does help on 
average to improve productivity, profitability, organizational commitment and other 
employee attitudes (Rosen et al., 2005). 
2.8.2 How ESOPs are structured  
A company can create a trust fund for employees, which would serve as a holding 
structure for an ESOP. The company would then have the option of either 
subsidising the trust with funds to purchase shares, or contribute shares directly to 
the plan. The company could also provide guarantees allowing the trust to borrow 
money to purchase shares. A combination of all three can also be adopted (The 
National Center for Employee Ownership, Undated). Employers can also afford 
shares directly to employees.  
Usually, employees are exempt from paying taxes on their contributions until they 
receive the shares or proceeds from the ESOP; but when they sell, they are then 
liable for taxation; alternatively, this may be the case when they leave the company 
or retire. Once this has occurred, the employee has the option to either sell the 
shares on the market, sell them back to the company, or alternatively to keep the 
shares (The National Center for Employee Ownership, Undated). 
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2.8.3 Various ESOP models  
ESOPs vary in architecture depending on the desired outcome. Success measures 
such as productivity improvements, increased dividend flows, an engaged and 
responsive labour force, lower operating costs, higher quality returns are but some 
of these measures (Hunt, 2013). The different variations are detailed below. 
2.8.3.1 Share Appreciation Rights  
 
One of the more common structures used are share appreciation rights. These rights 
give employees the option to cash out, or get payment in shares or a combination 
or both on any appreciation in share value of the concerned entity. 
If a specific entity has a share value of R100 per share at the inception of the 
scheme, and a value of R800 during the vesting period, employees are entitled to 
R700 in cash or R700 worth of shares. These shares are accounted for in employee 
remuneration as gross income in the year where the scheme matures (Hunt, 2013). 
Table 4 below contains some of the advantages and disadvantages of this type of 
scheme.  
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Table 4: Advantages and Disadvantages of Share Appreciation Plans (Hunt, 
2013). 
Advantages  Disadvantages   
They work well in rising markets  The plan does not work well in in 
depreciating market 
When cash settled share dilution in the 
company is minimized  
Share ownership is diluted when settled 
using shares  
Assist in retaining the right staff, whilst 
ensuring that those exiting the company 
do so without those incentives  
Continued disaggregation of 
shareholders makes the scheme 
difficult to administer when settled using 
shares  
Easy to administer when cash settled   
Is administratively easy especially if 
cash settled  
 
Rights settled using equity ensures 
better management of profit and loss 
outcomes  
 
 
2.8.3.2 Share Performance Plans  
 
These shares are linked to overall company performance and are used to incentivize 
employee productivity and align employer and employee objectives. These shares 
are conditional on the company meeting specified share performance targets.  
If the share price of a company is R100 per share at the date of inception, and 
appreciates to R800 per share at maturity, employees are entitled to the specified 
number of shares at R800 per share. Similar to share appreciation schemes, 
performance shares are treated as gross income and subjected to Pay as You Earn 
(PAYE) (Hunt, 2013). Table 5 stipulates some of the advantages and disadvantages 
of share performance plans. 
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Table 5: Advantages and Disadvantages of Share Performance Plans (Hunt, 2013). 
Advantages  Disadvantages   
Performance plans work well in 
appreciating and depreciating markets  
Free share allocation creates dilution 
effect 
The scheme imposes performance 
criteria on beneficiaries   
Beneficiaries may become disillusioned 
if performance criteria is arduous  
The scheme is easy to implement  Implementation becomes complex with 
increasing shareholder base  
Profit and loss metrics’ are easily 
managed   
 
 
 
2.8.3.3 Forfeitable Share Plans  
 
Forfeitable share incentive plans are plans structured to afford employees free 
shares on condition that they comply with specific company provisions. In the event 
where these conditions are contravened, the shares revert back to the company or 
special purpose vehicle chosen.  
Conditions imposed on this scheme may be performance related or employment 
period related. Beneficiaries of the scheme receive dividends and profit from share 
appreciation. These structures may also be structured such that they are cash 
settled at maturity performance, shares are treated as gross income and subjected 
to PAYE (Hunt, 2013). Table 6 contains some of the advantages and disadvantages 
of this plan.  
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Table 6: Advantages and Disadvantages of Forfeitable Share Plans (Hunt, 
2013). 
Advantages  Disadvantages   
Performance plans work well in 
appreciating and depreciating markets  
Free share allocation creates dilution 
effect 
The plan is flexible and provides a 
capability impose performance criteria  
Beneficiaries may become disillusioned 
if performance criteria is arduous  
Profit and loss metrics’ are easily 
managed   
Implementation becomes complex with 
increasing shareholder base  
 
2.8.3.4 Deferred Annual Bonus Plans 
These plans include the deferral of beneficiaries’ annual bonus payments towards 
purchasing shares. Most of these plans have been used as successful retention 
strategies performance shares are treated as gross income and subjected to PAYE 
(Hunt, 2013). Table 7 contains some of the advantages and disadvantages of this 
plan. 
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Table 7: Advantages and Disadvantages of Forfeitable Share Plans (Hunt, 
2013). 
Advantages  Disadvantages   
The plan has good retention elements  Participation rates from employees 
tends to be low  
Ideal for investors for employee 
purchased shares   
May become disincentive if 
performance conditions too arduous  
Performance conditions may be 
imposed on the plan  
Gross employee earnings may be 
significantly increased if bonuses 
increased to facilitate deferral  
Provides ability to manage short and 
long term performance  
 
 
2.8.3.5 Broad-based share ownership plan  
Broad based share incentive plans are commonly implemented to attract and retain 
specific qualifying individuals to the company. The plan not only assist in aligning 
the financial interests of the company but also can be used to meet specific 
regulatory requirements. To qualify as a broad-based share incentive plan in terms 
of the income tax Act, the plan must comply with the following requirements:  
 Participants must directly purchase shares in the company  
 Employees may only be restricted from selling shares for 5 years 
 The combine market value of the shares may not exceed R50, 000 (Hunt, 
2013).  
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2.8.4 Characteristics of successful ESOPs 
Successful ESOPs are buttressed by a shared mind-set, which is anchored by 3 
fundamental pillars. The first of these pillars is equity, the second is culture, making 
people feel and think like owners, and the third is a common understanding of key 
business disciplines and a common commitment to pursuing those (Rosen et al., 
2005). 
2.8.4.1 Equity Ownership 
Entities that afford organizations capital traditionally own those businesses, whilst 
management is accountable to these owners. If the company does not succeed, the 
capital providers carry all the risk in the business, whilst claiming all the earnings 
and returns if the entity succeeds. These capital providers are concerned with the 
success and prosperity of the organization (Rosen et al., 2005). 
The challenge these owners face is pursuing profits and growth with a workforce 
that is not aligned with the goals and aspirations of the organisation. Companies 
have tried addressing this challenge with other tools such as performance reviews, 
motivational speeches and team building exercises in hopes that employees will 
inspired to perform better. Employees are incentivized with bonuses, salary 
increases, promotions with the expectation and employees will align with company 
objectives (Rosen et al., 2005).  
The confrontational relations between labour and management has created an 
environment where strike and lockout are used as tools to advance individual 
interests. These interactions are supported by the premise that collective labour is 
willing to disadvantage the company in order to further their own individual goals 
(Rosen et al., 2005).  
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The principle underlying ESOPs is that employees are incentivised through 
ownership to pursue long term success of the business. The ability to garner support 
for the ESOP when it comes to equity is dependent on the amount of equity the 
organization provides. Insubstantial and intermittent share offerings will unlikely 
make recipients recalculate their economic interests (Rosen et al., 2005). 
2.8.4.2 Ownership Culture  
Organizational culture has transformed over time, previously characterized by a 
command and control ethos where employees did as they were told. Employees of 
these organizations were part of a rigid hierarchy where individuals could not 
contribute to decisions made. The rigid structures was further accentuated by dress 
code, hours worked, freedom to come to and go, pay and bonuses, parking spaces 
and other indications of power and status (Rosen et al., 2005).  
To establish an ownership culture organizations need to eliminate the ‘us’ versus 
‘them’ mentality that has plagued many organizations. An approach that could be 
used to mitigate this behavioural framework is to constantly communicate with staff. 
This entails sharing information about the organization relating to its operations 
including much of the financial data to which investors and analysts are traditionally 
privy to and that senior managers use to run the business (Rosen et al., 2005). 
Employees need to get a sense that are aware of operational financials that 
managers use to make decisions. A second approach would be source the opinions 
of employees when making important decisions. This does not in any way advocate 
for people voting on everything and making every decision. This approach seeks to 
engender a sense of collective decision making on those decisions that affect the 
whole company (Rosen et al., 2005). 
 
   
44 
2.8.4.3 Business Discipline  
In organizations that have successfully implemented ESOPs, employees are 
concerned with, and drive the business disciplines that help their company do well. 
Employees are taught their companies’ key business disciplines. These successful 
organizations are staffed with employees who understand how to contribute to 
improving performance and how to measure the results. Employees in these 
organizations are engaged and have managed to successfully embed the principle 
of driving business discipline by doing the following: 
 Identifying critical performance metrics;  
 Outlining performance objectives and targets;  
 Sharing ideas on how to improved performance; 
 Continuously monitoring and tracking those critical performance metrics; 
 Celebrating and rewarding wins (Rosen et al., 2005). 
2.8.5 Benefits of Establishing an ESOP 
ESOPs can be used as a vehicle to facilitate the sale of the shares over a period of 
time, whilst ensuring employees still retain the capability to sell their shares to other 
employees when parting ways with the company. Apart from incentivising the 
desired behaviours by employees in an organisation, ESOPs can form part of an 
employee’s company benefit package (Voison and Volaw, 2007). 
Effective ESOPs create a working culture where an employee’s individual enterprise 
is stimulated which ultimately leads to improved productivity. Employees in these 
organisations, because they are empowered as owners of the business, tend to be 
more entrepreneurial when solving problems.  They possess more creative ideas for 
solving problems in the organization. Consequently, these employees take 
ownership of their decisions and exercise more discretion when carrying out tasks 
(Postlethwaite et al., 2005). 
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According to Postlethwaite et al. (2005), these factors foster an environment where 
employees are motivated and empowered to act in the best interests of the 
organization – via a collective voice. 
Gamble et al (2001) studied the correlation between job satisfaction and improved 
company performance. Employees that were beneficiaries of ESOPs were found to 
have a higher job satisfaction which resulted in improved company performance. 
The study also investigated the employment setting of these companies. Working 
conditions in these organisations where characterised by the following: 
 Suitable working conditions 
 Ability of employees to participate in the decision making process   
 Employees displayed an intimate knowledge and understanding of 
company’s key business drivers  
 Employers and employees were aligned in their goals  (Gamble et al., 2001) 
There are common traits found in companies that encourage ESOPs. These 
companies are more innovative and stable, with a staff turnover that is lower than 
companies without ESOPs. Companies with effective ESOPs poses faster 
employment growth and higher rates of survival (Rosen et al., 2005).  
2.8.6 Criticism of ESOPs 
Transforming employees into owners reduces the overall company costs. This in 
part is due to the fact that as employees become more aligned to company owners, 
the overall company cost is reduced through productivity gains and improved 
company performance. However, this may create corporate governance failures as 
the line of separation between ownership and control becomes blurred (Mitchell et 
al., 2005). 
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Abdullah (2006) studied the implementation of ESOP and its effect on corporate 
governance. He found that the application of ESOPs are not associated with a return 
on assets, however he did find a negative correlation between the use of ESOPs 
and corporate governance.  
Some of the strongest weaknesses of ESOPs is the lack of excitement generated 
within the company at the different levels. Those charged with the responsibility of 
implementing ESOPs in companies, often treat ESOPs as just another benefit or 
financial tool. These include company owners, human resource practitioners and 
finance professionals (Rosen et al., 2005). 
Managers, often responsible for business execution are not encouraged to run the 
business differently. Employees are not educated and informed about what is meant 
to be an owner, and are neither expected to change their approach to their jobs. Due 
to the erroneous application of ESOPs, companies are unable to tap into the 
immense energy, intelligence and extra effort throughout the organization required 
to meet today’s global business challenges (Rosen et al., 2005). 
Criticism levelled at ESOPs include that they are highly dependent on tax breaks 
and favourable accounting treatment. Critics have claimed that ESOPs cannot, as 
independent structures, lead to improved company performance (Rosen et al., 
2005). 
Winther et al. (1997) concluded that ESOP implementation does not necessarily 
result in increased profits. They focused on 110 companies with the key areas of 
focus being on productivity and profitability. The results of the study was that ESOPs 
had little or no impact on profits, however the analysis highlighted increased 
productivity. 
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2.8.7 Financing an ESOP 
In most cases ESOPs are funded by employers through structured loan facilities to 
the designated holding structure of the ESOP. The loans mostly have favourable 
repayment conditions in lieu of forgoing dividends used to repay the loan. When a 
company has a strong balance sheet, on occasion, ESOPs may be directly funded 
by the company and the debt owed by the holding structure settled outright (Voison 
and Volaw, 2007). 
There are other common financing instruments used to finance ESOPs, such as 
bank loans where the employer acts as a guarantor. Other funding mechanisms 
include call-option agreements, where the holding structure may only purchase 
shares from those financial institutions that originally financed the purchase of the 
shares (Voison and Volaw, 2007). 
2.8.8 ESOPs in other parts of the world  
The USA has for many years led the way with regard to ESOPs with other countries 
following suit with application of these principles in their companies. The United 
Kingdom, through many of their large corporations have some kind of broad 
ownership plan, whilst in Ireland large energy companies offer ESOPs. Other 
European countries that offer similar arrangements include Spain and Italy, offering 
worker co-operatives in their important sectors (Rosen et al., 2005).  
ESOPs have been used by other countries to privatize state owned entities, 
countries include Poland, Russia, Slovenia and Hungary. China’s government has 
allowed employees to buy shares in enterprises it owns. ESOPs have been used in 
other countries such as Australia, Egypt, Jamaica and Kenya (Rosen et al., 2005). 
Freeman and Knoll (2008) conducted an empirical study using 10 years of data from 
companies in the USA that have implemented ESOPs. Their study showed that the 
implementation of ESOPs led to an average increase in productivity and profitability 
that benefited both employees and employers. Their study found that ESOPs 
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accounted for $14 billion annually in equity contributions, plus $3 Billion attributable 
to increased job stability, as well as non-qualified benefits of greater work 
satisfaction and reduced stress (Freeman et al., 2008).  
Jones et al. (2006) studied a large data set from publicly listed entities in Finland 
and concluded that the implementation of ESOPs in organisations improved 
company performance. Most companies in the UK have used ESOPs for the 
purpose of tax incentives as the main reason for implementing ESOPs (Robinson et 
al., 2005).  
ESOPs have been implemented successfully by many international companies in 
many different sectors. Construction companies, banks, insurance companies, 
textile manufacturers, architectural firms, health care providers, hotels and resorts 
and many other industries have successfully employed ESOPs (Rosen et al., 2005). 
2.8.9 Summary 
In summary, ESOPs enable extensive employee ownership; and they have the 
ability to foster a sense of individual enterprise that fuels productivity in companies 
that have imbued a culture of ownership amongst their employees. ESOPs generally 
contribute positively to company performance; and they provide a stable and 
dynamic working environment, when administered effectively. ESOPs cannot be 
implemented in isolation; but they require a combination of factors to make them 
successful.  
There are different ESOP structures and funding models that can be adopted 
depending on the desired outcome. Section 2.9 seeks to give a broad summary of 
ESOPs conducted in SA, and the different structures adopted.  
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2.9 Overview of ESOPs in South Africa 
A number of companies have implemented ESOPs in their organisations.  Table 8 
below contains a summary of ESOPs across multiple companies operating in 
different industries and all adopting a company specific model. 
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Table 8: Summary of ESOPs in SA (Motswenyane, 2009). 
 
 ESOP Transactions 
 
 
COMPANY  DESCRIPTION  TERM  FUNDING 
RATE  
DIVIDENDS  
ABSA 
BANK  
Employees part of BEE 
consortium (effective 1% 
stake in ABSA). General 
ESOP for all employees (not 
only HDSA) provided a 
further 1%  
5 year 
vesting 
period  
7 year 
lock in 
period  
 
 
Maximum 
implied 
funding 
rate of 
7.5% per 
year 
No dividends 
earned until 
shares are 
acquired 
AngloGold  
Ashanti 
ESOP for employees 
Patterson grades A, B and C) 
– c.30, 000 employees, 91.5% 
HDSA. 1.4% of issued share 
capital dispersed to 
beneficiaries.  30 “free 
shares” and 90 “loan shares” 
at a 10% discount to the 
market value 
7-year 
term with 
vesting 
in five 
annual 
tranches 
from 
year 3. 
7% on 
loan 
shares   
50% 
dividends for 
debt, net 
dividends to 
beneficiaries.
100% 
dividends 
from free 
shares   
Discovery  2 models - targeted 
employees would receive free 
shares vesting at later date. 
Second, employee given 
options to purchase shares at 
pre-determined prices.  
 
5 year 
vesting 
period  
No 
funding 
cost.  
No dividends 
to employees 
until shares 
are owned  
 
Standard 
Bank & 
Liberty Life  
ESOP for all non-
management employees  
10 year 
lock-in  
8.5%  Dividends 
used for debt 
Murray  
Roberts 
 & 
10% sold to trusts, general 
employees and HDSA 
managers. The broad-
based trust, at least 200 
shares each at R3, 200 per 
employee 
Stagge
red 
vesting 
periods 
with 10 
year 
lock in. 
Interest 
free. 
Dividends 
used to 
repay 
vendor 
funding 
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COMPANY  DESCRIPTION  TERM  FUNDING 
RATE  
DIVIDENDS  
Impala  
Platinum  
c.3% to SA employees in 
Patterson A, B & C grades 
and any new employees who 
join within two years.  
 
10 years 
 
 
interest free 
capital  
Dividend post 
expenses, 
taxes and 
debt 
repayment.   
Medi-Clinic Non-management 
employees, 4% stake in 
Medi-Clinic’s 15% BEE 
transaction. 
10 year 
lock in 
period 
Not 
disclosed 
20% div. For 
10 years 
Edcon Employees were sole 
beneficiaries of 10.66%. 
option structured plan with 
periodic cash payments 
Vesting 
period of 
3 and  
6 years 
26% for 
shares 
vesting in 3 
years and 
12.3% for 
shares 
vesting in 6 
years 
Dividends 
used to 
settle share 
funding   
FirstRand  3.5% through BEE 
transaction, Free shares to 
HDSA, at R6, 000 with 
remainder used to 
incentivize and retain 
targeted employees. 
4-10 year 
vesting. 
10 year 
lock-in 
80% prime 
less 
dividends 
received  
Dividends 
are used to 
service debt  
Distell Employees owned 45% of 
the 15% BEE deal. 
Employees not involved in 
separate ESOP but form 
part of consortium 
8 – 10 
years 
Inflation 
plus 7% 
less 
dividends. 
Dividends 
used to 
fund the 
vendor loan   
Group 5  4.5% to ESOP comprised a 
management scheme (87%) 
and a broad-based scheme 
amounting to R2, 000 per 
employee. 
 
2 – 4 years  None 
(interest rate 
was set 
equal to the  
dividend 
yield)  
No dividends 
till debt 
settled   
Mutual  &  
Federal  
2 components to ESOP – 
free shares and share 
options  
4– 6 
years 
vesting  
5– 8 year 
lock-in  
Interest 
free  
Dividends 
on free 
shares 
   
52 
 
2.10 Summary 
Chapter 2 provided a broad overview of empowerment applications around the world 
and the promotion of preferential policies aimed at historically disadvantaged 
groups. These groups have been previously discriminated against on the bases of 
their ethnicity, race, culture, language and various other descriptions. SA has a 
history of discrimination on the bases of race with policies aimed at economic 
exclusion of black South Africans.  
The South African government has enacted a number of transformation policy 
instruments in an attempt to empower HDSAs. For the broader economy these are 
governed under the BBBEE Amendment Act, whilst in the mining industry these are 
governed under the MPRDA, given effect in the Mining Charter. The Charter has 
several pillars against which transformation is measured. This report focusses on 
the ownership aspects of Charter.  
When applied correctly, ESOPs have proven advantageous to companies. The 
application of ESOPs in the mining industry will be investigated. Anglo American will 
be used as a proxy for the mining industry, with chapter 3 outlining the company’s 
impact and presence in the industry.  
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3 ANGLO AMERICAN 
3.1 Anglo American as a proxy for the mining industry 
In 2013, Anglo American recognised the need to more accurately measure and 
articulate the company’s economic and developmental impact in the South African 
economy and society as a whole. Assisted by PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) and 
Genesis Analytics, Anglo American produced a report quantifying its impact in the 
industry and the broader economy.   
This was necessitated by the perception that mining companies were not 
contributing concomitant benefits to South African society in line with those reaped 
by the company itself from SA’s mineral endowment. Figure 9 outlines the direct 
economic impact of Anglo American in the South African economy. The study found 
that Anglo American employs 82 000 people in South Africa, and that it had directly 
contributed R60 billion to the South African economy in 2012.  
The company accounted for approximately 2% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP); 
comprising wages and profits generated by the company. Apart from the direct 
impacts the company imparts in the economy, there were corollary indirect and 
induced impacts. The indirect impacts are those produced by the company’s 
spending in the economy, thereby stimulating further spending by suppliers, 
contractors, etc. According to the study 126, 000 jobs and R41 billion were realised 
from these indirect impacts in 2012 (Genesis Analytics and PwC, 2013). 
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The induced impacts are those produced by employees spending their money in the 
economy, which in turn produces jobs downstream. A total of 176, 000 jobs and R49 
billion were the result of the induced impacts. In total, approximately 384 000 jobs 
and R150 billion resulted from Anglo American’s existence in South Africa. This 
equated to 3% of employment and 5% of GDP (Genesis Analytics and PwC, 2013). 
 
Figure 9: Anglo American's economic contribution to SA (Genesis Analytics and 
PwC, 2013) 
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The mining industry, the study found, had a total capital expenditure of 
approximately R46.5 billion. Of this, Anglo American accounted for approximately 
33% of the capital expenditure, as is depicted in Figure 10 below. Anglo American’s 
capital expenditure, both in the form of expansionary and replacement capital, has 
increased from 2000-2012, as depicted in Figure 10, by an estimated eight jobs 
being created for every R1 million spent on capital expenditure.  
In 2012, the mining industry’s production revenue was approximately R372 billion, 
of which Anglo American accounted for approximately 32% of revenue, equating to 
R119 billion. When assessing the direct economic impact, in 2012, the mining 
industry contributed 9%; whilst Anglo American contributed 23% of the direct 
economic impact in the mining industry (Genesis Analytics and PwC, 2013). 
Figure 10: Anglo American’s capital expenditure (Genesis Analytics and PwC, 
2013) 
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The study also compared Anglo American’s contribution to the economy with that of 
other sectors. It found that the direct impacts from the company were comparable to 
the direct impacts from the entire agricultural sector (R73 billion). It was also 
comparable to that of the utilities sector (R79 billion), and a little more than half the 
direct impacts of the entire construction sector. When indirect and induced benefits 
are included, Anglo American accounts for considerably more than any of the 
different sectors, as depicted in Figure 12.  
Figure 11: Mining-production revenue (Genesis Analytics and PwC, 2013) 
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Figure 12: Distribution of AA's economic impact (Genesis Analytics and 
PwC, 2013) 
Figure 13 depicts SA’s balance of payments, together with the export revenue 
generated by Anglo American. Figures obtained from the South African Reserve 
Bank and Anglo American indicate that the company accounted for 12% of total 
South African exports, and approximately 41% of the total mining exports. Anglo 
American’s coal division supplied 72% of its production for local use; whilst KIO 
supplied the local domestic markets full demand at prices well below the export rates 
(Genesis Analytics and PwC, 2013). 
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analysis, Statistics South Africa 
The distribution of AA’s  economic impact (GVA) by industry, 2012 
Through strong linkages to other sectors of the 
economy, AA's production is a cornerstone of the 
economy.  
The sectors on which AA 
has the greatest indirect 
impact are utilities, 
transport & 
construction (R10bn) 
and manufacturing 
(R9bn) as these are 
where supplier 
expenditure is 
concentrated 
The sectors on which AA has the 
greatest induced impact are 
trade & real estate (R10bn) and 
finance, business & 
communication (R10bn) as 
these are where employee 
spending is concentrated 
Economic linkages: 
This  graph  sh o ws  how  AA’s  
direct economic output 
affects other sectors through 
indirect and induced impacts 
With direct, indirect and induced impacts considered, AA’s  total  GVA (R150bn) exceeds the 
direct GVA of South Africa’s  agricultural  sector  (R73bn),  ut ilities  sector  (R70bn),  and  
construction sector (R113bn) (note the comparison is to the direct GVA of other sectors only) 
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PwC and Genesis Analytics (2013) maintain that Anglo American accounted for 
approximately 3% of tax revenues in 2012, which equated to approximately R13.1 
billion. According to their findings, this amounted to 42% of the total tax paid by the 
entire mining industry. This was equivalent to 68% of the public health expenditure, 
and 57% of the education department expenditure over the same period. 
 
Figure 13: Local sales and exports (Genesis Analytics and PwC, 2013) 
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3.1.2 Summary  
Anglo American remains an important player in the mining industry and the SA 
economy. Due its size, commodity mix, and significance in the mining industry, Anglo 
American can be used as a proxy for the industry. Section 3.3 provides a summary 
of the empowerment transactions completed by the company’s various business 
units. 
Figure 14: Tax revenues paid by AA (Genesis Analytics and PwC, 2013) 
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3.2 Anglo American’s BEE Transactions 
Anglo American in SA implemented a range of empowerment transactions in its 
various business units, in order to meet MPRDA and Mining Charter requirements. 
The group completed empowerment deals in KIO, Anglo American Platinum (AAP), 
Anglo American Thermal Coal (AATC) and De Beers, its diamond division (Anglo 
American Corporate Finance , 2013). 
Typically, SA empowerment transactions were structured to lock in HDSA 
shareholders until 2014, to ensure that the 26% HDSA ownership in that year, as 
prescribed by the MPRDA and Mining Charter, was complied with. Anglo American 
adopted a hybrid methodology (e.g. measuring both equity and units of production 
transferred to HDSAs) (Anglo American Corporate Finance , 2013). 
3.3 AAP – Atlatsa / Bokoni 
3.3.1 Structure Overview 
AAP, one of the biggest business units in the group, completed a number of 
empowerment deals with HDSA entrepreneurs, host communities and employees. 
One of the deals involved the Bokoni platinum mine in the Limpopo province (Anglo 
American Corporate Finance , 2013). 
Figure 15 below depicts the structure of the deal. AAP disposed of 51% of Bokoni 
Platinum Mines (previously Lebowa Platinum Mines) to Atlatsa (a BEE company). 
AAP transferred its 100% interest in Bokoni Platinum Mines to a new wholly-owned 
subsidiary, Bokoni Platinum Holdings (previously Lebowa Holdco). Atlatsa (via 
Plateau) acquired a 51% share in Bokoni Platinum Holdings from AAP, with the 
remaining 49% being held by AAP. Bokoni Platinum Holdings owns 100% of Bokoni 
Platinum Mines and 100% of the projects Ga-Phasha, Boikgantsho and Kwanda. 
The financing structure is presented in Appendix 2 (Anglo American Corporate 
Finance , 2013).  
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3.3.2 Anglo American Platinum Community Empowerment 
AAP completed an empowerment deal with host communities in Rustenburg, 
Amandelbult, Mogalakwena and Twickenham operations, as well as AAP’s labour-
sending areas (LSAs).  The structure includes an umbrella trust called the Lefa La 
Rona Trust (LLRT), acting as a conduit and bank to the underlying development 
trusts (DT) in each of the four operational areas. The trust also acts as a non-profit 
company for the labour-sending areas (LSA NPC) (Anglo American Corporate 
Finance , 2013). 
 
 
Figure 16: Atlatsa/Bokoni structure (Anglo American Corporate Finance , 2013) 
 
Figure 15: AAP BEE deal structure 
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The LLRT was set up in November 2011 at the time when the AAP share price was 
R556/share. JSE and shareholder approval was obtained; and on 15 December 
2011; 6, 290, 365 (2.33% of AAP market capitalisation) of AAP shares were issued 
to LLRT. (All the other AAP joint ventures (JV’s) are outlined in Appendix 3) (Anglo 
American Corporate Finance , 2013). 
The transaction involved AAP issuing new shares worth R3.5 billion to a trust for the 
benefit of the communities. AAP provided Notional Vendor Financing (NVF) for the 
whole transaction; hence no cash was required from AAP (except for an up-front 
donation of R629, 037 to the LLRT to subscribe for the shares). The NVF structure 
is in place for 10 years, after which a sufficient quantity of shares will be sold to repay 
the NVF; and the LLRT will retain the remainder. 
A total of 60% of the ordinary AAP dividends on the shares were held back and used 
towards the repayment of the NVF. The remaining dividends (40%) were paid to the 
LLRT, which, in turn, distributed the funds to the DTs and LSA NPC according to the 
determined allocation splits (Anglo American Corporate Finance , 2013).  
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3.4 AATC 
AATC, one of the smaller business units in the division, conducted an empowerment 
deal with HDSA partners. AATC is not a listed entity, compared to the other business 
units in the group; and it is wholly owned by Anglo American.  
3.4.1 Structure overview 
Anglo Inyosi Coal (AIC) is a venture entered into between Anglo South Africa Capital 
(ASAC) (representing AATC) and Inyosi (Pty) Ltd, as displayed in Figure 16. AIC’s 
share capital is 73% owned by ASAC and 27% owned by Inyosi (Pty) Ltd. Inyosi 
(Pty) Ltd is 33% owned by Pamodzi Coal (Pty) Ltd; and 33% owned by Ndonsa 
Mining (Pty) Ltd (named Lithemba Consortium); 19% owned by WDB Investment 
Holdings (Pty) Ltd; and 15% owned by a Community Trust (Anglo American 
Corporate Finance , 2013). 
 
Figure 16: Anglo Inyosi Coal structure (Anglo American Corporate Finance , 
2013) 
AIC purchased assets from Anglo Operations Proprietary Limited (Anglo Coal 
division). The capital structure of the deal is described in Appendix 4. 
Pamodzi Lithemba WDB Community
Consortium Consortium Trust
33% 33% 19% 15%
ASAC Inyosi
73% 27%
AIC
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3.5 De Beers 
3.5.1 Structure overview 
Figure 17 illustrates the De Beers empowerment structure. Several empowerment 
partners were co-opted into the consolidated holding company. Ponahalo purchased 
a 26% holding in De Beers Consolidated Mines (DBCM). The remaining 74% is 
owned by De Beers South Africa (DBSA).  
The purchase price of R3.7 billion was funded with preference shares issued to 
Standard Bank, with maturity dates between 2009 and 2013.  Of this amount, DBSA 
guaranteed R800 million. DBCM was funded with senior debt from the Royal Bank 
of Scotland (RBS); and it had a facility of R1.8 billion with Standard Bank.  The equity 
contribution for the BEE shareholders was R10 million (Anglo American Corporate 
Finance , 2013). Appendix 5 illustrates the financing structure. 
 
Figure 17: De Beers’ structure (Anglo American Corporate Finance , 2013) 
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3.6 DTC SA Empowerment 
As part of the 2008 diamond dealers’ licence application, De Beers committed to 
empowering the Diamond Trading Company of South Africa (DTC SA) prior to the 
expiry of the licence in August 2013. It was envisaged that DBCM (26% BEE 
empowered) would acquire DTC SA from De Beers Group Services (DBGS), which 
is 100% held by DBSA. However, owing to the economic downturn in 2008/2009 
and the subsequent strain on the DBCM balance sheet, DBCM has not been in a 
position to purchase DTC SA at a fair value. The group structure prior to the 
proposed transaction is illustrated in Figure 18 (Anglo American Corporate Finance 
, 2013) 
 
 
Figure 18: DTC structure (Anglo American Corporate Finance , 2013) 
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3.7 Employee Share-Ownership Plans (ESOPs) 
All Anglo American business units in SA have ESOPs. The ESOPs for the different 
business units are outlined in Table 9 below. At inception, KIO’s scheme was R8.7 
billion, whilst the net equity value in 2012 was R5.2 billion (Anglo American 
Corporate Finance , 2013). 
KIO’s ESOP has outperformed all other business units in Anglo American. 
Disappointingly, both Anglo American South Africa and Anglo American Platinum’s 
schemes have not performed well; and they have delivered less than satisfactory 
value for employees (Anglo American Corporate Finance , 2013).  
Table 9: AA business unit ESOPs (Anglo American Corporate Finance , 2013) 
Entity ESOP Number of 
employees 
Scheme value 
at inception 
Net equity 
value Dec 
2012 
Meaningful 
value  
      
AAP Kotula 46, 000 R1.5 billion R0.5 billion R7.5 billion 
KIO Envision 6, 000 R8.7 billion R5.2 billion R1.8 billion 
Anglo 
American 
SA 
(AASA) 
Siyaphambili 10, 000 R0.2 billion R0.2 billion R5.2 billion 
 
3.8 Summary  
Anglo American has concluded a number of empowerment deals through its various 
subsidiaries. It has done this by adopting diverse financing models and holding 
structures tailored for the unique needs of each company. Most of the significant 
empowerment deals have involved HDSA partners. Chapter 4 will provide a general 
assessment of these ESOPs and their performance. A framework of what a 
successful ESOP looks like will be developed, and these ESOPs assessed against 
that framework. 
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4. Anglo American’s assessments of current ESOPs  
4.1 Performance assessment  
Anglo American conducted a study on the performance of current ESOPs employed 
in the different business units. These include: 
 AAP: Kotula; 
 KIO: Envision; 
 AASA (AATC, Corporate Centre, Global Shared Services (GSS), Vergelegen): 
Syaphambili; and 
 DBCM: Ponahalo (Anglo American South Africa, 2013). 
According to the company, as they are currently structured, the ESOPs across the 
business units are not consistent in terms of both design and generated returns. In 
terms of the financial structure, the main categories include: 
 Free shares (AASA, part of Kotula); 
 Notionally vendor-funded shares (part of Kotula, Envision, Ponahalo); and 
 Different vesting periods (3-5 years) (Anglo American South Africa, 2013). 
After analysing the performance of the ESOP, the company found that the majority 
of ESOPs have not performed satisfactorily, in financial terms, with the exception of 
Envision.  
 Kotula’s benefits have been limited to minimal dividends and a small value that 
vested in relation to the free shares; 
 Envision has delivered beyond expectation; 
 The AASA scheme’s benefits have been relatively modest; and 
 The DBCM scheme has not yielded any anticipated benefits for employees 
(Anglo American South Africa, 2013).  
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According to Anglo American, the performance of the ESOPs have been driven 
mostly by the commodity cycles, where Envision benefited from the iron ore up-
cycle; but Kotula and AASA suffered from general weakness in AAP’s and Anglo 
American plc’s share prices, respectively.  
Due to the varying architectures and the various financial performances of the 
ESOPs in the group, Anglo American cannot show that its employees have 
meaningful and consistent long-term share-ownership in the company, because 
employees sell their shares, after vesting. This is accredited to the need for short-
term financial needs, as opposed to long-term investment opportunities. 
Consequently, the employees do not experience any transparent long-term 
participation in the organisation (Anglo American South Africa, 2013). 
4.2 Original objectives of the schemes 
According to their findings, Anglo American believes some of the original objectives 
of the current ESOPs, such as wealth creation for employees, have not been met. 
This, in large part, is due to modest pay-outs for employees and the sale of shares 
by employees upon vesting, even in the case of high-performing schemes, such as 
Envision. The alignment of company performance with the individual performance 
of employees has not materialised.  
The ESOPs do not, in all cases, meet the employees’ needs. The day-to-day reality 
of employees' lives puts a stronger emphasis on the availability of cash than on 
active participation as a shareholder. The current notional vendor-funded structures 
are highly dependent on share price performance; whereas non-management 
employees have a far greater need for low-risk consistent cash income (Anglo 
American South Africa, 2013). 
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4.3 Summary 
Anglo American has conducted a number of ESOPs in its various business units. 
The financial performance of the ESOPs has been inconsistent. Employees have 
not fully benefitted from current ESOPs, with structures that are complicated and 
opaque to employees.  Chapter 5 seeks to propose a framework that encapsulates 
varying success factors of an ESOP, which can be used by mining companies when 
structuring new ESOPs or amending existing plans.   
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5 ESTABLISHING A FRAMEWORK FOR A SUCCESSFUL ESOP  
5.1 Principles underpinning the proposed framework  
The new proposed ESOP model has to take into account all that has been discussed 
with regard to the failures of current ESOP models in the industry, whilst providing 
mechanisms to alleviate these drawbacks. This is to ensure that ESOPs are 
instruments used by mining companies to foster all the virtues of an effective ESOP.  
It is envisaged any ESOP formulated under the framework should apply to 
employees of that organisation so long as they remain employees. Once an 
employee leaves the organization, the provisions of the ESOP would be forfeited 
and gained by the employee who replaces the departing employee. This is a critical 
principle of the proposed ESOP framework as this would ensure that companies 
continue to comply with regulation and that their employees continue to benefit from 
the ESOP. 
Similarly, employees that get promoted and fall within a higher bracket forfeit their 
benefits in the scheme. Any new employees that falls within the bracket becomes 
an automatic participant in the scheme. Beneficiaries of these ESOPs should be 
HDSAs that fall within the lower salary bands in the organisation. If there is a 
reduction in employee numbers, the benefits of that ESOP should be redistributed 
to the remaining employees. This is to avoid constant dilution of employee 
shareholding to external partners when employees leave the company. 
The shares issued to employees must be placed in a holding structure, which is 
managed by representatives elected by the employees. Each representative union 
would have a nomination, based on the percentage share of those employees it 
represents in the category of workers that qualify. The trust must have full voting 
rights, preferable with a seat on the board of directors of the company through the 
trust.  
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The payment of annual dividends must also be balanced with the need to finance 
the sale of shares to employees. It is proposed that the vesting period of the shares 
be extended to allow for a more consistent and notable dividend flow to the 
employees. It is important to note that once the debt has been settled, employees 
would be entitled to 100% of the dividend flow.  
Once vested, employees are allowed to sell their shares to qualifying employees 
within the organization. These are HDSA participants that fall within the specified 
salary bracket. There should be an obligation placed on the trust to maintain a 
certain amount of capital to ensure rights offers are followed through. This is to 
mitigate the risk of diluting shares and also to ensure continued empowerment.  
To ensure that during times when companies are performing satisfactorily, due to 
rising commodity prices, or improved productivity gains, a sliding scale should be 
used, when determining what percentage should flow to the employees. During high 
commodity cycles dividends should be skewed towards debt repayment. During low 
cycle periods dividends paid should be skewed towards cash payments for 
employees.    
The report does not propose separate dividend policies for employees and other 
ordinary shareholders. It is incumbent on the trust, upon receiving dividends from 
the company to institute this sliding scale.  
It is not enough for companies to institute an ESOP without engaging employees on 
the meaning of the ESOP, and providing employees with financial literacy programs. 
These must be geared towards sensitising employees to the financial aspects of the 
business as new owners. This, with a view of aligning company interests with 
individual employee interests.  
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These aspects are equally important; and they need to be applied in concert, 
accompanied by constant engagement with the employees and the provision of an 
environment conducive to individual employee enterprise.  
5.2 Proposed Framework  
A successful ESOP must be buttressed by a set of key fundamental pillars if it is to 
meet the collective needs of critical stakeholders. In terms of an ESOP, these critical 
stakeholders include employers, employees and the government. This section will 
outline a proposed framework for companies to utilise when instituting a new ESOP 
or reviewing their old ESOPs. This framework as aforementioned will be 
underpinned by the set of principles outlined in section 5.1.  
5.2.1 Meaningful economic participation   
The first most important pillar is the equity stake in the company. If companies want 
to employ ESOPs successfully, they need to ensure that they afford a meaningful 
equity value toward the ESOP. The percentage depends on the dynamics of the 
business. In terms of the Mining Charter, the requirements are 26% HDSA 
participation.  
Khan (2014) studied the effect of ESOPs on company profitability in the South 
African mining industry. The study was conducted on JSE listed companies. The 
study found that ESOP percentages for these companies ranged from 1.4%-3% of 
the total shares for of the company. His study also found that only 8 out of the 30 
company’s listed had ESOPs in place (Khan, 2014).  
Short and Keasey (1999) contended that the effect of ESOP is not only dependent 
on the existence thereof, but highly dependent on the level of ownership. Their study 
depicted a positive relationship between ownership and performance at various 
percentages. In Anglo American the highest equity stake from broad based ESOPs 
is 3% from Envision.  
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5.2.2 Instilling an ownership culture  
The second critical pillar to the framework is the ability of a company to instil an 
ownership culture within the business. Employees must have the ability and 
opportunity to contribute to decision making processes, accompanied by 
implementation of those business decisions. This must be enabled by mechanisms 
that allow for efficient dissemination of information and channels that enable 
employee participation in identifying process failures and improvement 
opportunities. These contributions should be heard, and timeously acted upon.  
5.2.3 Driving the business disciplines  
For successful ESOPs companies must ensure that employees are concerned with 
driving the business disciplines. These employees must understand how their 
individual performance contributes to overall performance improvement. An 
enabling environment where these employees identify critical performance metrics, 
are clear about the performance objectives and targets whilst continuously 
monitoring and tracking those metrics is needs to be created. Ideas about 
performance improvement must be shared between lower level employees and 
management.   
5.2.4 Share price performance  
A prerequisite for any successful ESOP is an improving share price. This is critical 
to the success of an ESOP in large part due to the fact that the repayment for the 
equity afforded by the company depends on dividend flow. Increasing share normally 
is indicative of improved company performance, and results in improved dividend 
payment which results in shorter vesting periods.  
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5.2.5 Financial incentives  
Under the proposed framework, short term and long term financial incentives are 
critical to the success of the ESOP. The implementation of the ESOP must ensure 
that employees recalculate their economic interests. Meeting the short term needs 
of employees and protecting employee incentives from commodity cycles is an 
important feature of the ESOP under this new framework. 
5.2.6 Aligned goals  
Employers and employees must have aligned goals and objectives under the 
proposed framework. These objectives and goals centre on business sustainability, 
operational and financial performance. Other considerations include meeting 
stakeholder requirements and ensuring business risk is mitigated.  
5.2.7 Productivity gains  
Improved productivity is a measure of business efficiency. Application of an ESOP 
should ensure improved productivity from the workforce as this will indicate a 
positive collaborative relationship between management and lower level employees 
and an indication of employee sentiment.  
5.2.8 Engaged and responsive workforce  
A successful ESOP must result in an engaged and responsive workforce. 
Employees must be responsive to the needs of the organisation in a dynamic 
business environment. This has to be supported by effective employee involvement 
mechanisms. Strikes and lock-outs are not features of an engaged and responsive 
workforce.  
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5.2.9 Regulatory compliance  
One of the more important pillars supporting an effective ESOP is the compliance 
with regulatory requirements. In terms of SA, mining companies must comply with 
requirements of the Charter. 
5.3 Summary  
Chapter 5 summarises a proposed framework that should utilised by employers 
when constituting an ESOP. The ESOP is underpinned by the set of principles 
specified. The framework comprises key pillars that should be considered when 
implementing an ESOP, with underlying programmes underpinning these key pillars. 
The framework is summarised in figure 19 below. ESOPs in Anglo American will be 
tested against this framework and their success assessed according to the 
framework.  
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Figure 19: Proposed ESOP framework 
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6 ANALYSIS OF CURRENT ESOPS USING PROPOSED 
FRAMEWORK  
Anglo American has two listed companies in its stable, namely, AAP and KIO. This 
report provides an analysis of the performance of the ESOPs, as well as some of 
the key drivers behind this performance. The ESOPs will be evaluated using this 
new proposed framework laid out in Chapter 5.  
6.1 KIO  
Kumba Resources (now KIO), was unbundled in 2006, resulting in KIO owning 74% 
of the Sishen Iron Ore Company (SIOC). Exxaro Resources took up 20%; SIOC 
development SPV (Pty) Limited (3%); and employees through the ESOP, named 
Envision, owning the remaining (3%). The combined minority shareholding accounts 
for the 26% demanded by the Charter. The shares were meant to vest in years five, 
six and seven from the subscription date (Kumba Iron Ore Limited, 2006-2015). 
6.1.1 Share performance and financial incentives  
Table 10 below contains the parameters used for the analysis, with figures obtained 
from KIO’s annual integrated financial report, from 2006-2014. 
Table 10: KIO’s annual financial results (Kumba Iron Ore Limited, 2006-2015) 
Year Total 
dividend  
(R million) 
Earnings per 
share 
(R/share) 
Dividend per 
share 
(R/share) 
Dividend 
cashflows  
(R million) 
     
2006 12 0.84 0.8 7 
2007 98 9.85 7.5 11 
2008 271 22.8 21 32.00 
2009 189 21.88 14.6 59.00 
2010 419 44.67 34.5 62.00 
2011 587 53.11 44.2 127.00 
2012 426 37.97 31.7 120.00 
2013 144 48.08 40.04 83.00 
2014 478 34.32 23.34 169.00 
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Figure 20 depicts KIO’s share price performance from its initial listing in 2006 to 
2014. The graph shows how the company experienced tremendous share price 
growth from listing until 2012; but this was followed by a precipitous fall in sub 
sequent years. 
 
Figure 20: KIO’s share price (Kumba Iron Ore Limited, 2015) 
 
Figure 21: KIO’s earnings-dividend 
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There is a direct relationship between a company’s share price, earnings per share, 
and dividends per share. Higher earnings are accompanied by a higher share price 
and increased dividends. 
 
Figure 22: KIO's dividend flow graph 
Figure 22 illustrates the difference between the total dividends paid out to the 
shareholders, and the final dividend paid out to the employees. On average, the total 
dividend is more than 3 times the dividend cash flow. The difference between the 
two dividend payments is used to finance the cost of the debt; and it is also used for 
trust fees and the associated costs.   
The performance of Envision was driven mostly by the commodity cycles benefiting 
from the iron ore up-cycle. Envision’s financial performance has been good, with 
shareholders benefiting from high dividend pay-outs.  
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6.1.2 Meaningful economic participation  
Envision owns a total of 3% of the companies share allocation without any voting 
rights pre-vesting of the shares.  
6.1.3 Instilling ownership culture and aligning goals  
In October 2012, KIO employees engaged in unlawful industrial action that resulted 
in significant losses, in both physical assets and also lost production output. In their 
2012 annual report, KIO stated that, “labour relations issues proved to be the biggest 
challenge, despite the unprecedented financial payouts to employees at the end of 
2011” (Kumba Iron Ore Limited, 2012). 
6.1.4 Productivity  
An analysis of KIO’s productivity was conducted post the implementation of 
Envision. Figures were obtained by comparing the production output (million tons) 
by total permanent employee numbers with data from KIO’s annual reports from 
2007 to 2015. Figure 23 below displays the results obtained from. 
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Figure 23: KIO's productivity 
KIO has increased its production over the years, however, employee numbers have 
significantly increased. The increase in employee numbers outpaced the increase in 
production output, as a result overall employee productivity has reduced. In their 
2012 annual report, KIO highlighted absenteeism having a significant impact on 
productivity.    
6.1.5 Engaged and responsive workforce  
Labour relations has constantly been a risk highlighted by the company during the 
past years. According to the 2015 annual report, labour relations formed part of the 
top 10 risks. This the company asserts is as a result of the restructuring proposed 
by the company necessitated by declining commodity prices. According to KIO, the 
risk is also caused by zero dividend pay-outs expected in 2016 due to lower 
commodity prices (Kumba Iron Ore Limited, 2015). 
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According to Lucas Phiri, National Union of Mine Workers (NUM) Chief Negotiator 
at KIO, mining companies do not have the best interest of employees at heart. He 
said, “the government must consider taking back mining licences of these mines 
who their objective is to exploit workers, maximize profit and when they are done 
they move away from their social responsibilities and leave some workers in bad 
conditions, injured or sick.” This follows the announcement of the plans by the 
company to retrench 2633 employees (NUM, 2016). 
6.1.6 Regulatory compliance  
In their 2015 annual report, KIO highlighted the Department of Mineral Resources’ 
interpretation of the Mining Charter as a significant challenge. Post the 
implementation of ESOP, the company had complied with all elements of the mining 
charter. However there still remains uncertainty around the issue of “once 
empowered, always empowered” (Kumba Iron Ore Limited, 2015). 
6.1.7 Summary  
Figure 24 below contains a dashboard summary of the components discussed 
above.  
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Figure 24: Summary of KIO’s performance evaluated against proposed 
framework 
6.2 Anglo American Platinum  
In 2008, AAP reached an agreement with its employees and the labour unions on 
the terms and structure of the companies’ ESOP. The AAP Kotula Trust would 
facilitate the scheme on behalf of the beneficiaries, to a total of 2.5 million shares. 
These were issued to the trust, equating to approximately 1% of the company’s 
ordinary share capital. When the shares were issued, 90% of the beneficiaries would 
be HDSAs. The ESOP had a value of R1.5 billion at inception, with a total of 46, 000 
beneficiaries (Anglo American Platinum Limited, 2009).  
To achieve the 26% ownership target, AAP opted to utilise various mechanisms, 
such as a community trust, joint ventures, disposal of the assets, and establishing 
the company’s ESOP in order to achieve this milestone.  
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6.2.1 Share performance and financial incentives  
An analysis was conducted, comparing what the dividend flow to individual 
employees would have been, had the company opted to use only the ESOP as the 
empowerment vehicle. This was compared to the actual dividend payment that each 
employee received after the establishment of the program. Table 11 below contains 
the parameters used for the analysis; and these were obtained from AAP’s annual 
integrated financial report, from 2008-2014.   
Table 11: AAP annual financial result (Anglo American Platinum Limited, 
2008-2014) 
Year Employee   
numbers  
Dividend/share 
(c/share) 
Shares in 
issue 
(million)  
Dividend 
paid (R) 
Shares @ 
26% 
(million) 
Dividend 
@ 26% 
ownership 
(R) 
       
2008 50152 3500 237.1 704.16 18.53 12205.5 
2009 58320 0 236.8 0 18.53 0 
2010 54022 683 261.6 135.15 18.53 2342.66 
2011 58541 700 261.1 127.82 18.53 2215.63 
2012 56379 0 261 0 18.53 0 
2013 49816 0 261 0 12.35 0 
2014 49763 0 261.2 0 6.18 0 
 
It is important to note that the shares were structured to vest in the fifth, sixth and 
seventh year from the subscription date. In 2012, some of the shares had vested; 
and as such, some of the employees were entitled to the capital value of each Kotula 
share allocated to them. From the dividend paid, provisions had to be made for trust 
fees and other associated liabilities (Anglo American Platinum Limited, 2009). 
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Figure 25: Anglo American Platinum dividend comparison 
 
In 2008, AAP paid a dividend of 3, 500 cents per ordinary share (c/share), as 
illustrated in Figure 25. The Kotula trust had 1, 069 million shares, which meant that 
the total ordinary dividend paid to the trust amounted to R53.3 million. This equates 
to R704.16 per employee for each share that they owned.  
AAP did not pay a dividend in 2009, with dividends of 683 c/share and 700 c/share 
paid in 2010 and 2011, respectively. This resulted in a dividend per employee 
amount of R135.15 in 2010 and R127.82 in 2011. From 2012-2014, the company 
did not pay any dividend. 
Had the ownership percentage increased to 26%, instead of the 1% at inception, the 
dividend flow to the employees would have significantly increased. In 2008, this 
would have resulted in a total dividend of R648.55m paid to the trust, resulting in 
R12, 205.50 per employee for every share they owned; and this is significantly 
higher than the R704.16 received in 2008.   
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Similarly, the subsequent 2010 and 2011 pay-outs would have been R2, 342.66 and 
R2, 215.63, respectively. Increasing the equity stake of employees to 26% is not 
always pragmatic due the responsibilities mining companies have toward 
communities and other stakeholders. However it does demonstrate the impact of 
improved equity participation by ESOPs on individual employees. 
 
Figure 26: Anglo American Platinum share price (Anglo American Platinum 
Limited, 2015) 
AAP’s share price chart has a similar trend to the divided flow chart. The chart 
reflects the performance of the company. The chart reached a peak above R1, 400 
in 2008; and it fell to a price below R200 in 2015. This coincides with the highest 
dividend paid by the company in 2008. There is also a direct relationship between 
the earnings per share of the company and the dividend flow, as displayed in Figure 
27. 
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Figure 27: AAP earnings – dividend chart 
AAP’s ESOP has not paid significant dividends to employees. This was in large part 
due to the poor financial performance of the company resulting in low dividend 
payments. 
6.2.2 Instilling an ownership culture and aligning goals with an engaged and 
responsive workforce  
Following the tragic events at Marikana in 2012, where an industrial dispute turned 
violent, resulting in the death of 34 mine workers, followed by a 5 month strike in the 
platinum belt, the industrial action resulted in significant losses for the company. 
After reaching an agreement, the company continued to report non-procedural 
incidents such as underground sit-ins and illegal stoppages in 2013 (Anglo American 
Platinum Limited, 2014). 
Delivering his Chairman’s report for the 2014 reporting period, the Chairman of AAP, 
Valli Moosa, pointed to a need for a renewed emphasis on labour relations. Key 
amongst the important requirements is a labour force that has a meaningful stake in 
the business, and a subsequent responsibility in the fortunes of the company, 
according to the Chairman. This requires more serious engagement with the 
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employees and increased ownership in the business. This is interpreted as an 
implicit recognition of the ineffectiveness of the current ESOP. 
6.2.3 Meaningful economic participation  
Kotula owned 1% of the company’s ordinary share capital. When the shares were 
issued, 90% of the beneficiaries would be HDSAs.  Final vesting for Kotula shares 
was in 2014 with the ESOP subsequently wound up. AAP indicated its intention to 
consider the implementation of a new ESOP (Anglo American Platinum Limited, 
2009). 
6.2.4 Productivity  
 
Figure 28: Precious Metals Sector Productivity (Goldman Sachs, 2012). 
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Wage inflation has increased by 11% whilst productivity levels in the gold and 
platinum sectors have declined by 4% per annum over a 10-year period as depicted 
in figure 28 above.  
Figure 29: AAP labour productivity profile (Anglo American Platinum 
Limited, 2008-2015). 
For AAP Productivity levels vary year on year without a significant positive or 
negative trend.  Figure 29 above reflects the productivity level at AAP post the 
implementation of the ESOP.  
6.2.5 Regulatory compliance  
Similar to KIO, the implementation Kotula ensured compliance with HDSA 
ownership requirements of the Charter with uncertainty around interpretation with 
the DMR remaining an issue.  
 
 
   
90 
6.2.6 Summary of Kotula  
Figure 30: Summary of AAP performance evaluated against proposed 
framework 
6.3 Summary  
Anglo American’s two listed entities had ESOPs that had varying financial 
performance. High company earnings lead to higher dividend payments, which are 
ultimately reflected in a rising share price. High company earnings are achieved 
through productivity gains and demand factors.  When measured against the other 
success criteria, the ESOPs did not compare favorably. Productivity levels, instilling 
an ownership culture and aligning goals with employees remain a challenge.
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7 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
Empowerment of previously disadvantaged groups has been applied in various 
countries throughout history; and it has been applied in many different forms aiming 
to achieve specific political, social and economic objectives. In the profiled countries, 
these policies have had varying degrees of success.  
South Africa continues to struggle with poverty, unemployment and inequality; 
realities brought about by past policy instruments and bias. BEE is seen as an 
appropriate approach for providing opportunities for HDSAs who suffered from 
economic exclusion. 
The major mining houses have completed empowerment deals, with the most 
significant deals involving individual HDSA entrepreneurs. The deals have been 
completed as a response to the requirement of the Mining Charter, governed under 
the MPRDA, for more ownership participation by HDSAs.  
These empowerment deals have garnered criticism for not being sufficiently broad-
based, and for empowering a few individuals. Mining companies have also 
implemented ESOPs in their respective businesses.  
In this report, Anglo American was used as a proxy for the industry, due to its size 
and diverse nature.  Current ESOPs in Anglo American were found to be 
inconsistent, sometimes complicated; and they remain largely opaque to the 
employees.   
When employees are made to be part owners and meaningful participants in the 
success of the business, this leads to a more productive workforce that is engaged, 
and has an increased sense of responsibility in generating higher returns. Current 
ESOPs have failed to imbue an ownership culture within their employees. An 
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employee’s ability and opportunity to participate in the decision-making processes 
contributes to the success of an ESOP.  
A successful ESOP should not just pay out money to employees, but it should 
change behaviors of both beneficiaries, management and owners of the business.  
This report has proposed a new framework for ESOPs under which it is envisaged 
that future ESOPs be modelled. The framework takes into account the needs of all 
important stakeholders, namely employers, employees and government. The 
framework is centred on 9 key pillars.  
These are share performance, meaningful economic participation, financial 
incentives, driving the business disciplines, instilling a culture of ownership, aligned 
goals, productivity gains, and engaged and responsive workforce and regulatory 
compliance.  
The new framework is underpinned by a set of key fundamental principles. 
Employees short term needs should be reconciled with the long term aspiration of 
the organisation. The technical aspects of the ESOP should be aligned with the 
change management requirements for effective implementation. The impact of the 
ESOP needs to change employee behaviour and thus benefits should be immediate 
and meaningful.    
The performance of ESOPs in Anglo American varied when assessed against the 
framework. With the exception of Envision, Anglo American’s ESOPs have delivered 
very modest financial benefits to employees. They have not achieved their intended 
purpose, of empowering employees and aligning company performance with 
individual employee performance. Envision has benefited from the iron ore up-cycle; 
but Kotula and AASA have suffered from a general weakness in AAP and AA plc’s 
share prices, respectively. When assessed against the other pillars of the 
framework, KIO and AAP did not perform satisfactorily.  
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This report recommends that mining companies, irrespective of size and commodity 
group, implement this proposed approach, in order to fully harness the virtues of 
ESOPs. The report further recommends that appropriate programmes specific to 
each pillar be instituted.  
Further work needs to be conducted on how to create a working environment where 
employees can participate in the decision-making processes of the business. 
Programmes that that will give effect to the framework can be investigated. Clarity 
needs to be sought on the relationship between the BBBEE Amendment Act and the 
Mining Charter. Issues around interpretation of the ownership pillar (“once 
empowered always empowered”) is also required.   
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9 APPENDICES 
 
Appendix 1: Summarised HDSA ownership results 
SECTOR HDSA 
OWNERSHIP 
(%) 
PARTICIPANTS 
(million) 
MIN. NET 
VALUE  
(R billion) 
MAX. NET 
VALUE  
(R billion) 
          
Mining Industry  37.7 7.0 155.32 282.018 
Black investors 22.8       
Community  10.8       
ESOPs 4.2       
PGM 39.5 2.77 43.442 65.987 
Black investors 19.5       
Community  18       
ESOPs 2       
Gold  28.8 0.14 7.182 32.267 
Black investors 18.6       
Community  0.9       
ESOPs 9.2       
Coal 43.9 1.75 24 49.512 
Black investors 32       
Community  5.3       
ESOPs 6.3       
Diamonds  26 0.11 0.616 5.29 
Black investors 4.4       
Community  11.6       
ESOPs 10       
Iron Ore  38.2 1.48 53.22 115.33 
Black investors 24       
Community  12       
ESOPs 2.2       
Manganese 50.1 0.41 -0.436 8.389 
Black investors 33.3       
Community  16.3       
ESOPs 0       
Chrome 28.1 0.45 1.824 5.242 
Black investors 15.9       
Community  7       
ESOPs 5.2       
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Appendix 2: Summary of Anglo American Platinum Atlatsa/Bokoni 
empowerment deal 
 
 
 
Sources of funds  Rmil Application of funds  Rmil 
    
Atlatsa/Pelawan/Plateau    
    
Plateau “A” prefs issued to 
APL 
1, 193 Equity acquired in Holdco  2, 600 
Pelawan “B” prefs offered to 
APL 
1, 100 Repayment of bridge 
finance to APL 
93 
APL free contribution to 
communities and ESOP 
149   
Total 1* 2, 442 Total 2* 2, 693 
    
SBC loan  500 Costs, community, ESOP 249 
    
 2, 942  2, 942 
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Appendix 3: Anglo American Platinum Joint Ventures (JVs) 
BEE partner Asset Status 
ARM Mining 
Consortium: 
 - 83% ARM;  
- 17% 
Communities 
Modikwa AAP contributed mineral rights to the 50:50 JV for 
no consideration.  The mine is at steady state 
production.  ARM is a listed company with 
substance and significant other interests and should 
be able to stand behind its own obligations. AAP 
has been vendor-funded, through a loan, ARM’s 
and, to an extent, the community’s portion of the 
expansion capital. Should Modikwa underperform, 
this loan could be at risk of default.  At present, 
there is a limited risk of refinancing or default. 
Approximately R17 million of the R131 million loan 
has been re-paid to date. 
Northam Pandora AAP gave 5% of its 50% interest to Mvelaphanda 
Resources Limited (“Mvela”) – now a subsidiary of 
Northam - and sold another 2.5% for R65 
million.  The R65 million remains receivable. 
Bakgatla Union Royalty agreement conversion and purchase 
consideration of R420 million in return for 15% 
participation interest.  All funding to Bakgatla has 
been repaid.  The Bakgatla has assets and it is 
unlikely that Anglo American would need to provide 
funding to the Bakgatla. The Bakgatla have 
expressed a desire to take up an additional 11% of 
Union. The additional take up right would be on a 
commercial basis and not vendor funded by Anglo 
American.  
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Africa Wide 
Minerals 
Prospecting a 
subsidiary of 
Wesizwe 
Platinum 
Limited 
Wesizwe AAP holds 211.9 million shares in Wesizwe (26.6%). 
An equalisation payment amounting to circa 
US$18m is still due by Wesizwe.  Wesizwe 
completed a deal with Jinchuan in May 2011, which 
would fund the entire project capital of the 
company’s project to full production through debt 
and equity. 
RBN BRPM The BRPM JV was initially established in 2002 as a 
50:50 JV between Royal Bafokeng Resources 
(Proprietary) Limited and AAP.  The JV was 
reconfigured in 2009 to enable RB Resources to 
acquire a majority 67%interest in the JV with the 
remaining 33% held by AAP 
RB Plat was formed as a new company with a 67% 
ownership in the BRPM JV. From the 4th January 
2010, operational control of BRPM vested with RB 
Plat.  The successful listing of RB Plat on the JSE 
took place in November 2010 with AAP, holding an 
effective interest in the listed company of 
12.6%.  AAP received R1.452 billion by selling 
shares in the IPO process.  
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Appendix 4: Funding model for Anglo-Inyosi Coal 
 
 
Source of funds  Rmil Application of funds  Rmil 
    
Equity Contribution 185 Acquisition capital 6, 971 
Equity                           Inyosi 50 Project expenditure  4, 400 
Equity                           ASAC                                         135   
    
Preference shares    
Preference shares        
ASAC 
6, 786   
    
Debt finance     
Loan facility                
AASAF 
4, 400   
    
Total  11, 371  11, 371 
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Appendix 5: Ponahalo-funding Structure 
Sources of funds  Rmil Application of funds  Rmil 
    
Equity 
Contributions to 
Ponahalo 
10 Acquisition of 26% in DBCM 3 710  
Equity                           10   
    
Preference 
shares to 
Ponahalo 
3 700   
Preference 
shares        
Standard 
2 900   
Guaranteed 
preference 
shares  Standard 
800   
    
Debt finance     
Loan facility                
AASAF 
4 400   
    
Total  3 710  3 710 
 
